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LEGITIMATE YET MANIPULATIVE: THE 
CONUNDRUM OF OPEN-MARKET 
MANIPULATION 
GINA-GAIL S. FLETCHER † 
ABSTRACT 
  Is manipulation possible in the absence of misconduct? This is the 
foundational inquiry at the heart of open-market manipulation. Open-
market manipulation captures the attention of lawmakers and courts 
because it is market manipulation effected entirely through facially 
legitimate transactions. Whereas traditional, well-accepted forms of 
market manipulation involve deception, fraud, and monopolistic 
prices, open-market manipulation involves no objectively bad acts and, 
instead, is accomplished through permissible transactions executed on 
the open market. As enforcement of this form of manipulation 
increases, the question arises—when, if ever, is a legitimate transaction 
manipulative? 
  To the Securities Exchange Commission and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (“the Commissions”), the answer is 
simple—legitimate transactions are manipulative if the trader intends 
to manipulate the market. The Commissions’ enforcement actions are 
based on the theory that the manipulative intent of the trader is 
sufficient to transform otherwise legitimate transactions into open-
market manipulation. But this approach is fundamentally flawed. 
Traders may be treated differently for the same conduct under this 
approach, and it leaves market actors none the wiser as to when their 
conduct may be considered manipulative. Indeed, the Commissions’ 
intent-focused approach only exacerbates the chaos that currently 
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surrounds the law of market manipulation and makes enforcement 
against open-market manipulation less effective. 
  This Article is the first in-depth analysis of the concept of open-
market manipulation, and it finds the Commissions’ approach to be 
sorely lacking. While the Commissions are correct to conclude that 
facially legitimate transactions may be manipulative, the intent-centric 
model is untenable. Intent is an insufficient tool in identifying open-
market manipulation because it does not address the most important 
aspect of open-market manipulation—how open-market transactions 
harm the markets. Thus, this Article argues that courts and regulators 
should, instead, coherently identify the necessary conditions under 
which open-market transactions are harmful to the markets. 
Specifically, this Article argues that only those open-market 
transactions that impede the markets’ efficiency and undermine their 
integrity should be deemed manipulative. Linking the theory of open-
market manipulation to the purpose of anti-manipulation laws would 
provide the Commissions with more cogent principles on which to hold 
manipulators liable for their seemingly legitimate transactions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Manipulation is difficult to define . . . . [D]rawing a line between 
healthy economic behavior and that which is offensive has proved to be 
too subjective and imprecise to produce an effective regulatory tool.1 
Traditionally, the notion of market manipulation triggers ideas of 
deliberate misconduct that allows unscrupulous actors to profit at the 
expense of others. Whether through false or misleading information or 
through market monopolization, market manipulation commonly 
evokes the image of a bad actor, oftentimes a speculator, who has 
purposefully attempted to “game the market” in ways that are 
injurious to the proper functioning of the markets. It is this expectation 
 
 1. Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A Comment on Dealing with Market 
Manipulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 391, 392 (1991). 
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of manipulation that makes the allegations of market manipulation 
against Kraft Foods (“Kraft”) most perplexing. 
Kraft is one of the largest consumers of wheat, using it to produce 
many of its signature products—Oreos, Wheat Thins, Triscuit crackers, 
and Chips Ahoy! cookies.2 As a primary consumer of a classic physical 
commodity, Kraft represents the quintessential “good” actor in the 
commodities market. It is not a speculator, trading for pure profit; 
rather, it is an end user of wheat, and it utilizes the commodities 
markets to protect itself from price fluctuations and shortages that 
could significantly impact its business. Kraft is the type of market actor 
for which the futures markets exist—an entity that uses the markets to 
offset risk inherent to its business. Yet, in 2015, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) accused Kraft of manipulating 
the wheat market.3 
The allegations of manipulation arose from Kraft’s trading 
strategy of taking advantage of a price discrepancy between the price 
for wheat on the futures market and the physical market.4 Futures are 
contracts that represent the right to buy or sell a commodity at a set 
price on an agreed-upon date.5 The price of futures contracts is 
connected to, but not necessarily the same as, the price of the asset on 
which they are based.6 Thus, the price of wheat futures is often affected 
by conditions in the physical market. In 2011, drought ruined 
worldwide wheat crops, and as a result, wheat on the physical market 
was at an all-time high.7 In response, Kraft purchased a six-month 
 
 2. CFTC v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Kraft is one 
of the largest domestic users of #2 Soft Red Winter Wheat . . . . Kraft uses that wheat in the 
production of snack foods, including Oreo, Ritz, Triscuit, Wheat Thins, and Chips Ahoy!” 
(citation omitted)). 
 3. Id. at 1004 (“Plaintiff alleges that in October 2011, despite the results of its trial run, Kraft 
wheat procurement staff proposed to Kraft senior management a strategy of buying $90 million 
of December 2011 wheat futures in order to depress the price of cash wheat and inflate the price 
of futures wheat.” (citation omitted)).  
 4. The physical market is also known as the cash market. 
 5. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging 
with Credit Derivatives, 33 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 826 (2014) [hereinafter Fletcher, 
Hazardous Hedging] (defining futures and other derivative instruments).  
 6. Scott H. Irwin & Dwight R. Sanders, The Impact of Index and Swap Funds on 
Commodity Futures Markets 6–7 (OECD, Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Paper No. 
27, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/trade/agricultural-trade/45534528.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX5H-
MNZD] (explaining that buyers of futures contracts are owners of the physical commodity, since 
their “long” position is matched by real inventory, and that they can create a “short” in the 
physical supply by holding their long position, increasing the price of the commodity).  
 7. Gary Vocke, Wheat Year in Review (Domestic): Higher Domestic Use and Exports Lower 
2010/11 Ending Stocks, USDA ELEC. OUTLOOK REP. FROM THE ECON. RES. SERV. 1 (Jan. 2012), 
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supply of wheat futures, which, at the time, was cheaper than physical 
wheat.8 The wheat connected to the futures was not of a high enough 
quality for Kraft to use in its manufacturing; nonetheless, Kraft’s $90 
million purchase of wheat futures allegedly lowered the price of wheat 
on the cash market.9 With the price of physical wheat reduced, Kraft 
“netted out” its futures10 and avoided $5.4 million in losses.11 
Was Kraft’s large purchase an act of manipulation or the conduct 
of a savvy end user seeking the best price? To the CFTC, Kraft was 
guilty of market manipulation because it purchased wheat futures with 
the intent to manipulate the physical price of wheat downwards.12 
Interestingly, Kraft’s strategy did not involve illegal transactions or 
behavior typically associated with market manipulation. The CFTC did 
not allege that Kraft “cornered” the market;13 nor did it allege that the 
 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/ers/WHS//2010s/2012/WHS-01-24-2012.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/DRE4-DVSM] (“The all-wheat season-average price (SAP) for 2010/11 was $5.70 per 
bushel. This price was above . . . SAP for the preceding marketing year of $4.87, but less than the 
all-time record $6.78 in 2008/09 and . . . previous record of $6.48 in 2007/08. The 2010/11 price was 
higher than all years . . . [before] 2007/08.”); Lester R. Brown, The Great Food Crisis of 2011, 
EARTH POL’Y INST. (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.earth-policy.org/mobile/releases/update90 
[https://perma.cc/C2J8-PFZD] (“As the new year begins, the price of wheat is setting an all-time 
high in the United Kingdom.”); Wheat, TRADING ECONS., https://tradingeconomics.com/
commodity/wheat [https://perma.cc/3MZV-8KYC] (“Historically, Wheat reached an all time high 
of 1194.50 in February of 2008 and a record low of 192 in July of 1999.”); Wheat Prices Reaches 
All Time High!, LEVERAGE ACAD. F. (Jan. 27, 2011, 9:41 PM), http://leverageacademy.com/
blog/2011/01/27/wheat-reaches-all-time-high/ [https://perma.cc/T9Y8-SYHV] (“Algeria’s 
purchase of 800,000 metric tons of milling wheat this past Wednesday pushed wheat prices to an 
all time high of $8.61¼ a bushel, up 2.1%. Wheat prices have reached a record high, greater than 
during the 2007-2008 food crisis.”).  
 8. See Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1003 (stating that “[i]n developing that 
strategy, Plaintiff[] claim[s] that Kraft intended that the market would react to its enormous long 
position by increasing the price of the December 2011 futures contract and lowering the price of 
cash wheat available in the Toledo region.”); see also Michael Brooks et al., Did Kraft Manipulate 
Futures? FUTURES MAG., (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.futuresmag.com/2015/09/29/did-kraft-
manipulate-futures [https://perma.cc/P8YB-Q7HR] (noting that in 2011, physical wheat was 
trading at a premium to wheat futures). 
 9. Complaint at 8, CFTC v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 996 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (No. 
1:15-cv-02881). 
 10. With futures contracts, the holder may choose to accept delivery of the commodity or 
“net out” the contract by executing an equal, offsetting futures contract.  
 11. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d. at 1013–14.  
 12. Id. at 1013. 
 13. A corner is the process by which a trader dominates the market for a commodity and is 
able to control its supply. This practice is prohibited under the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. at 
1018 (discussing the definition of “corner,” and establishing that the complaint filed by the CFTC 
does not allege a corner); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) 
(prohibiting market manipulation).  
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transactions were fictitious.14 Indeed, all Kraft’s transactions, in both 
the physical and futures markets, were legal; yet, according to the 
CFTC, the company was guilty of market manipulation solely because 
of its intent to manipulate. 
The allegations against Kraft are an example of open-market 
manipulation—manipulation accomplished through facially legitimate 
transactions.15 Allegations of open-market manipulation have become 
more common over the years, as the Securities Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”), the CFTC (collectively, the “Commissions”), and private 
plaintiffs bring suit alleging that traders manipulated the markets using 
legitimate trades.16 In seeking to impose liability for open-market 
manipulation, the Commissions recognize and are attempting to 
address the potential distortive effect of complex trading strategies and 
new financial products that hide behind a façade of legitimacy.17 
However, the Commissions’ theoretical basis for liability is woefully 
inadequate and does not improve the markets’ functioning. 
To the Commissions, the line between legitimate and 
manipulative conduct lies exclusively in the intent of the actor. 
 
 14. Fictitious trades include wash sales, order matching, and trading pools, practices in which 
ownership of the commodity or security does not change hands, but the transactions are done to 
give the appearance that there is trading in the commodity or security. Fictitious trades are illegal 
under the Commodity Exchange Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Commodity 
Exchange Act of 1936 § 6(c), 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78j.  
 15. Maxwell K. Multer, Open-Market Manipulation Under SEC Rule 10b-5 and its 
Analogues: Inappropriate Distinctions, Judicial Disagreement and Case Study: FERC’s Anti-
Manipulation Rule, 39 SEC. REG. L.J. 97, 102 (2011) (“Open-market manipulations involve no 
objectively fraudulent or bad acts.”). To be clear, the scope of this Article’s analysis does not 
include spoofing, layering, or other algorithmic trading strategies.  
 16. See, e.g., ScripsAmerica, Inc. v. Ironridge Global LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1134 (C.D. 
Cal. 2014) (involving a plaintiff that brought suit alleging that the defendant had “fraudulently 
manipulated the market for [plaintiff] Scrips stock . . . by ‘short selling’ Scrips’ shares . . . in an 
effort to drive the share price down artificially and require Scrips to issue more shares to 
[defendant] Ironridge pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement”); Burt v. Maasberg, No. 
ELH-12-0464, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46732, at *72 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2013) (“[P]laintiffs allege 
that ‘defendants,’ and, in particular, Blair, engaged in market manipulation . . . conceal[ing] the 
group’s intentions of buying Lyris stock, to drive away other investors, and to depress the price 
of Lyris stock.”); SEC v. Ogle, No. 99 C 609, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 
2000) (explaining that the SEC alleged that the defendant acted as a statutory underwriter when 
selling unregistered stock during its market manipulation scheme).  
 17. Matthew Evans, Note, Regulating Electricity-Market Manipulation: A Proposal for a New 
Regulatory Regime to Proscribe All Forms of Manipulation, 113 MICH. L. REV. 585, 601–02 & 
n.109 (2015) (highlighting that the CFTC has made it clear that conduct “giving rise to a 
manipulation charge need not itself be fraudulent or otherwise illegal,” and that this allows the 
CFTC to target strategies and products that feign legitimacy (quoting Prohibition on Market Price 
Manipulation, 75 Fed. Reg. 67657, 67661 (Nov. 3, 2010) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180 
(2014)))).  
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Specifically, the Commissions treat the intent of the trader to 
manipulate the markets as both necessary and sufficient to transform 
otherwise legitimate transactions into manipulation.18 Private parties 
alleging open-market manipulation have also adopted this approach.19 
The courts, on the other hand, are less predictable in their 
approaches.20 For some courts, intent alone is insufficient; these courts 
are unwilling to classify open-market transactions as manipulative 
without a showing of “something more.”21 The divergent approaches 
 
 18. Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial 
Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 510 (1991) (“[T]here is no objective definition of manipulation. 
The only definition that makes any sense is subjective—it focuses entirely on the intent of the 
trader.”); Hui Huang, Redefining Market Manipulation in Australia: The Role of an Implied Intent 
Element, 27 COMPANIES & SEC. L.J. 8, 12 (2009) (“‘[I]intent’ is an essential element of market 
manipulation without which a transaction would not be manipulative at all.”); see, e.g., Alexander 
F.H. Loke, The Investors’ Protected Interest Against Market Manipulation in the United Kingdom, 
Australia and Singapore, 21 AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L. 22, 24 (2007) (contending “that there is an 
irreducible relevance of motivations” in market manipulation cases); Lawrence Damian McCabe, 
Note, Puppet Masters or Marionettes: Is Program Trading Manipulative as Defined by the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S207, S223 (1993) (arguing that “[t]he 
presence of an improper purpose . . . is necessary to determine whether the activity should [have 
been] condemned as unlawful manipulation”). 
 19. Compare Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt. LLC., No. 02 Civ.0767 LBS, 
2002 WL 31819207, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (acknowledging that the plaintiffs adequately 
pled the scienter requirement by exhibiting “both the motive and the opportunity to defraud 
Nanopierce” (citation omitted)), with GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 211 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“Another reason why [the plaintiff’s] market manipulation claim fails is because 
he has not met the scienter requirement by offering evidence that GFL engaged in short sales for 
the purpose of artificially depressing the prices of National Medical and EquiMed stock.”).  
 20. See, e.g., GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd., 272 F.3d at 205 (explaining that market 
manipulation depends on the activity rather than the intent, and noting that “[t]he gravamen of 
manipulation is deception of investors into believing that prices at which they purchase and sell 
securities are determined by the natural interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by 
manipulators” (quoting Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1999)); Markowski v. SEC, 
274 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“It may be hard to separate a ‘manipulative’ investor from one 
who is simply over-enthusiastic . . . . Legality would thus depend entirely on whether the investor’s 
intent was ‘an investment purpose’ or ‘solely to affect the price of [the] security.’” (quoting United 
States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1991))); CFTC v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 153 F. 
Supp. 3d 996, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Intent is what separates ‘lawful business conduct from 
unlawful manipulative activity.’ . . . This means that the intent to artificially affect prices can 
convert otherwise legal, open-market transactions into manipulative activity.” (citations 
omitted)); CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“Although Masri dealt with the interpretation of federal securities laws, there is no doubt that 
marking the close or any other trading practices, without an allegation of fraudulent conduct, can 
also constitute manipulation in contravention of the CEA, so long as they are pursued with a 
manipulative intent.”); SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he Second 
Circuit has explicitly declined to answer the first question presented in this case—whether 
manipulative intent alone can support liability for otherwise legal open-market transactions.”). 
 21. See Mulheren, 938 F.2d at 371 (emphasizing that absent bad acts, the plaintiff needs to 
prove manipulative intent and also “other indicia of manipulation”); In re Coll. Bound Consol. 
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of the Commissions and the courts add an uncomfortable level of 
unpredictability to the markets, thus muddying an already chaotic 
corner of financial regulation. 
Open-market manipulation and the Commissions’ current theory 
of liability raise noteworthy questions that are largely unaddressed in 
academic literature on market manipulation. Anti-manipulation laws 
are geared toward making the markets safer and more efficient for 
investors. Yet, in targeting conduct that is illegitimate solely because 
of the intent of the trader, the Commissions’ approach to open-market 
manipulation has arguably deviated from their statutory purposes. The 
intent-centric approach of the government to open-market 
manipulation is a significant departure from the traditional 
conceptualization of market manipulation as conduct that is both 
harmful to the markets and accompanied by bad intent. Indeed, as this 
Article demonstrates, the Commissions’ intent-centric approach to 
open-market manipulation lacks a coherent basis for liability and 
weakens the efficacy of anti-manipulation enforcement actions. 
This Article addresses the issue of open-market manipulation by 
seeking to answer two foundational questions. First, can facially 
legitimate transactions be manipulative (that is, improperly distort the 
markets)? Second, if yes, on what basis should open-market 
transactions be considered manipulative from a legal standpoint?22 As 
to the first question, this Article argues that open-market transactions 
can distort the markets. However, unlike the Commissions, this Article 
rejects intent as the sole basis for deeming legitimate yet manipulative 
 
Lit., Nos. 93 Civ. 2348 (MBM), 94 Civ. 3033 (MBM), 1995 WL 450486, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 
1995) (explaining that open-market manipulation claims have to plead the following elements: 
“1) ‘profit or personal gain to the alleged manipulator’; 2) deceptive intent; 3) market domination; 
and 4) economic reasonableness of the alleged manipulation” (quoting Mulheren, 938 F.2d at 370–
72)); Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk Disclosure 
and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 785–86 (2016) (discussing the courts’ definition of 
corporate scienter as a struggle to define “that scope of knowledge in a way that syncs to investors’ 
reasonable expectations”). 
 22. This Article faces its own internal conundrum that “manipulation” (and its derivatives) 
may refer to both (1) the act of distorting the market and (2) the legal claim of market 
manipulation. As best as possible, this Article delineates when it uses manipulation to refer to the 
act of distorting the market and when manipulation refers to an illegal act for which there is a 
legally cognizable claim, recognizing that not all distortive trades are per se legal violations. Thus, 
this Article uses “manipulative acts” (or something similar) to refer to trades that distort the 
market as a descriptive (not legal) matter; “manipulation,” “market manipulation,” and “illegal 
manipulation” (and their derivatives) are used to refer to manipulative acts that are also legal 
violations of anti-manipulation laws and regulations. For a discussion of the legal definitions of 
manipulation, see infra Part I.B.  
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transactions illegal. Intent is a necessary component of identifying 
open-market manipulation, but it is not sufficient on its own. The 
Commissions’ intent-centric basis of liability ignores the most 
important aspect of open-market manipulation—harm to the market. 
To the extent that open-market transactions harm the markets, they 
should be treated as illegal manipulation. This Article offers an 
alternative legal approach to open-market manipulation that looks 
both at the intent of the trader and the harm of her conduct on the 
markets. This Article’s proposed approach to open-market 
manipulation moves the inquiry beyond the intent of the trader to 
answer the fundamental question of why some legitimate transactions 
may nonetheless be wrongful. By adopting a market-harm approach to 
open-market manipulation, lawmakers and the courts can begin to 
develop more coherent principles for identifying and addressing this 
form of market manipulation. 
This Article is the first that analyzes the fundamental question of 
open-market manipulation in the securities and commodities markets 
from a legal standpoint. By focusing on the harm the transaction 
imposes on the market, this Article demonstrates that open-market 
transactions can be used to illegally manipulate the markets, and that 
the legitimacy of the underlying transactions does not render the 
conduct any less harmful to the markets. Instead of looking for 
“something more” or for wrongful conduct in order to hold a trader 
liable for open-market manipulation, lawmakers and courts should 
focus on the impact of the transactions on the markets. Analyzing 
open-market manipulation through its effect on the market would 
empower lawmakers to ignore the red herring of the transactions’ 
legitimacy and would allow them to instead concentrate on the harm 
of the transactions. A market-harm approach would thereby allow for 
an appropriate separation of illegally manipulative conduct from 
permissible transactions. To meaningfully ground liability for open-
market manipulation on harm to the market, it is necessary to define 
harm. This Article defines harm with reference to the goals of anti-
manipulation laws and the types of manipulative conduct that these 
laws target. Specifically, open-market trades can harm the markets by 
(1) undermining market efficiency by creating an artificial price and (2) 
impairing market integrity by creating unfair and dishonest market 
conditions. 
This Article proceeds in the following order. Part I details the 
goals and content of anti-manipulation laws. It also defines market 
manipulation from a structural standpoint, discussing the necessary 
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components of manipulation. Part II introduces the concept of open-
market manipulation and, through the use of case studies, establishes 
how facially legitimate transactions may nevertheless distort the 
market. Notably, the case studies also demonstrate the shortcomings 
of the Commissions’ intent-centric theoretical basis for open-market 
manipulation. Part II concludes that intent fails to adequately capture 
and deter illegal manipulation accomplished through facially 
legitimate transactions. Part III asserts this Article’s thesis and primary 
contribution to manipulation law and scholarship—liability for open-
market manipulation must be based on whether the transactions harm 
the markets’ efficiency, integrity, or both. Part III analyzes how open-
market manipulation distorts asset prices and therefore impairs the 
integrity of the market, similar to more easily identifiable forms of 
illegal market manipulation. Part III also argues in favor of a new basis 
of liability for open-market manipulation—whether the transaction 
was unfair to counterparties because it resulted in unjust wealth 
transfers, which ultimately undermine market integrity. In addition, 
Part III considers what role market discipline may play in limiting the 
effect of open-market manipulation on the markets. Part III outlines a 
proposal to assist lawmakers in improving detection and enforcement 
of open-market manipulation. Part IV discusses the benefits and 
potential drawbacks of this Article’s proposal. 
I.  A PRIMER ON MARKET MANIPULATION 
Preventing market manipulation was one of the initial motivators 
behind the adoption of the securities and commodities laws. Although 
the purpose of financial-market regulations and laws has since been 
extended, identifying, proscribing, and punishing market manipulation 
remains one of the primary goals of the Commissions in their oversight 
of the financial markets. This Part discusses the overarching goals of 
manipulation laws and regulation to provide a foundational 
understanding of why these laws exist. Part I goes on to discuss how 
market manipulation is defined both theoretically and statutorily. 
A. Goals of Manipulation Laws 
Market manipulation imposes significant social and financial costs 
on the financial markets.23 Because of this welfare-reducing impact on 
 
 23. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 
DUKE L.J. 977, 1006–07 (1992) (explaining that inaccurate stock prices induce corporations to 
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the markets, both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act”) and the Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”) (collectively, 
“the Acts”) identify the prevention of manipulation as one of their 
primary goals.24 Market manipulation undermines the fundamental 
operation of the financial markets—to facilitate the efficient allocation 
of capital within the markets.25 Indeed, manipulation has far-reaching 
consequences beyond the capital markets; it affects investments, 
consumer savings, and numerous aspects of the real economy.26 
Manipulation harms the market in two related ways. First, it 
undermines the market’s efficiency by distorting its pricing 
mechanisms.27 Second, it impairs the market’s integrity because the 
conduct can lead other market participants to believe the market is 
 
take actions that do not maximize their utility, while accurate stock prices facilitate efficient 
allocation of resources and encourage corporations to act in a manner that is socially desirable); 
see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 489, 498 (2013) (noting that under welfare economics, a general equilibrium theory 
posits “that a competitive equilibrium is good for the economy because it maximizes wealth” and 
that, therefore, activity that is anticompetitive or manipulative will result in suboptimal results 
that are likely to be economically harmful); Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: 
Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence, 31 ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 (2010) (explaining that market 
manipulation is socially costly since “[i]t distorts prices, and typically leads to distortions in 
commodity flows”).  
 24. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (2012) (prohibiting manipulative strategies, such as wash sales and fictitious 
sales, that aim to cause a change in the “bona fide price” of a commodity); 15 U.S.C. § 78j 
(prohibiting the use of manipulative devices in connection with the sale or purchase of any 
security). For example, in enacting the Exchange Act, Congress expressed its belief that 
manipulation of the securities markets is the cause of “widespread unemployment and dislocation 
of trade, transportation, and industry.” 15 U.S.C. § 78b. With regards to the CEA, Congress 
concluded that regulation of futures trading is necessary because futures transactions are 
“susceptible to manipulation and control” and may generate sudden changes in the market. Id.  
 25. Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 185 (2017) 
(“The capital markets exist for two purposes: (i) to allocate capital to the most profitable 
opportunities (on the macroeconomic level); and (ii) to help market participants invest or borrow 
money (on the microeconomic level).” (citation omitted)); Zohar Goshen & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006) (“[T]he 
ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain efficient financial markets and thereby improve 
the allocation of resources in the economy.”); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial 
Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2010) (“The basic goals of the markets have remained the 
same—namely, the efficient allocation, transfer, and deployment of capital resources and risk-
bearing.”). 
 26. Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung & Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price 
Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 368 (2003) 
(“[T]he empirical evidence suggests that the efficiency of the real economy (the actual production 
of goods and services) is enhanced when share prices become more accurate.”). 
 27. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 714 (“More accurate share prices and more 
liquid trading enhance the efficiency of financial markets.”).  
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unfair.28 Consequently, if left unchecked, manipulation can eventually 
lead to the demise of the market.29 
1. Market Efficiency.  Efficient markets incorporate information, 
accurately and quickly, into the prices of securities and commodities 
(collectively, “assets”).30 Two hallmark features of market efficiency 
are price accuracy and high liquidity.31 Liquidity refers to the ready 
availability of other traders with whom to transact in the markets and 
the ability of traders to execute transactions without significant market 
movement.32 Greater liquidity increases the accuracy of the market 
price for an asset; more accurate asset prices lead to greater liquidity.33 
 
 28. Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large 
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1982) (“If the public believes that the game is unfair 
and chooses not to play, the markets will suffer and the efficient allocation of capital will be 
impeded.”). But see Jill E. Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider Trading, 69 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 46, 46 (2016) (noting that because “federal securities laws do not prohibit all 
trading on material nonpublic information,” it is clear that not all participants begin the trading 
process with equal information, which may lead to unfairness). 
 29. Carole Comerton-Forde & James Rydge, Market Integrity and Surveillance Effort, 29 J. 
FIN. SERV. RES. 149, 149 (2006) (“Market integrity refers to the ability of investors to transact in 
a fair and informed market where prices reflect information.”).  
 30. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 721 (“In efficient markets, information about 
the value of firms is incorporated quickly and accurately into stock prices.”); Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 
(2003) (“[A] market is ‘efficient’ when prices always fully reflect available information.” (citation 
omitted)).  
 31. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 714 (“The two main determinants of market 
efficiency are share price accuracy and financial liquidity.”); see also Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. 
Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH U. L. REV. 
487, 494 (2015) (“Market efficiency and intermediation play a role in both facilitating securities 
offerings and enabling the class action that helps support the deterrence and enforcement 
necessary to create strong and healthy markets.”). 
 32. Douglas J. Elliott, Market Liquidity: A Primer, BROOKINGS INST. 3 (June 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Market-Liquidity.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QVA9-J6QT] (explaining that liquidity emerges from ease of transactions based 
on time restraints, minimal transaction costs, and presence of potential buyers willing to pay 
theoretical market value); Myles Udland, The Market is Getting Nervous About Something 
Experts are Struggling to Define, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 26, 2015 7:31 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/liquidity-in-the-bond-market-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/YF4H-
QC2K] (explaining that a liquid market is one in which trades can be executed with some 
immediacy at low transaction costs).  
 33. NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS, THE LOGIC OF SECURITIES LAW 144 (2017) 
(“Greater trading activity translates into greater liquidity directly. . . . The economic force leading 
from liquidity to accurate prices rests on the reality that liquidity attracts informed trading.”); 
Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk Through 
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1373 
(2009) (“Liquidity is one very important component of any market; it insures the accurate pricing 
of securities.”).  
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Consequently, both accurate pricing and liquidity are essential to 
efficient capital allocation in the financial markets.34 
Manipulation causes market inefficiency and capital misallocation 
by interfering with the pricing accuracy of the markets in two ways. 
First, asset prices are made less accurate as misinformation is injected 
into the markets.35 As inaccurate information is incorporated into the 
price of the asset, the market price moves further away from the value 
of the asset.36 False information, therefore, inhibits the ability of the 
markets to efficiently price assets and impairs the markets’ functioning. 
Second, manipulation may create a false appearance of liquidity in the 
markets, resulting in an artificial asset price.37 A manipulator who 
creates the illusion that there is more trading in an asset than there is 
in actuality, is distorting the levels of liquidity to exert pressure on the 
asset’s price. 
Distorted pricing, accomplished through either or both 
mechanisms, is detrimental to the markets’ fundamental purpose—the 
efficient allocation of capital.38 Anti-manipulation laws aim to reduce 
or eliminate transactions that undermine the ability of the markets to 
facilitate accurate, efficient price discovery.39 When manipulation 
impacts asset prices, the result is an inefficient allocation of capital, 
which, in turn, harms the aggregate social welfare as wealth is 
transferred from innocent investors to manipulators.40 To the extent 
 
 34. Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 39, 55–56 (2011) (explaining that banks and market makers “facilitate capital-raising by 
providing investors with liquidity . . . without interrupting the end-user’s longer-term employment 
of capital.”).  
 35. Kahan, supra note 23, at 987 (“[T]he amount and nature of the economic losses caused 
by inaccurate stock prices depend critically on the kind of mispricing.”).  
 36. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 23, at 504 (“[T]he market price is set under conditions 
of information asymmetry, and thus the market price is not fully informed.”); Steve Thel, 
Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the Text of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 398 (“Prices may change in response to 
false or misleading communications since security prices reflect what investors believe, even if 
those beliefs are wrong.”).  
 37. James Wm. Moore & Frank M. Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 
U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 50 (1934) (stating that manipulation leads to artificial and controlled prices). 
 38. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 730 (“The larger the deviation between 
price and value and the longer it takes for prices to revert to value, the less efficient the market 
is.”).  
 39. Id. at 713 (explaining that “the ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain efficient 
financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the economy”). 
 40. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 104 n.131 (2011) (“The threshold question for FOTM [fraud-on-
the-market] concerns the calculation of . . . net harm. An underdiversified informed trader who 
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that both the supply and demand of an asset and the information 
related to the asset are distorted, market actors may direct their 
resources toward assets or investments that are not accurately priced, 
thereby reducing the utility of the markets to investors as a whole.41 In 
determining whether conduct is manipulative, therefore, lawmakers 
must consider whether it results in inefficient pricing, thereby 
impairing capital allocation. 
2. Market Integrity.  Market integrity is a broad term that refers to 
notions of market fairness, investor protection, and the absence of 
misinformation and market abuse.42 The actual and perceived integrity 
of the financial markets are crucial to their ability to attract capital; 
investors invest only to the extent that they believe the markets are 
fair.43 Should investors see the markets as unfair, honest investors 
would refrain from participating, and those that participate in the 
 
suffers a loss might take steps to avoid future loss by incurring information costs. This is a social 
cost, as it is cheaper for companies to tell the truth.”); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, 
at 726 (“[T]rading against a party with superior information or based on fraudulent information 
will result in a loss.”); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1280–
81 (2017) (“Manipulated markets not only distort the prices and transactions in one marketplace, 
but they also have important implications for capital allocation, investments, and savings in other 
markets and the greater economy.”). 
 41. Janet Austin, What Exactly is Market Integrity? An Analysis of One of the Core Objectives 
of Securities Regulation, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 232 (2017) (“If prices reflect an asset’s 
fundamental value, this will result in the most efficient allocation of capital, as investors will pay 
no more for securities than their inherent value.”).  
 42. Donald Margotta, Market Integrity, Market Efficiency, Market Accuracy, 17 BUS. REV., 
CAMBRIDGE 14, 14 (2011). 
 43. Haft, supra note 28, at 1051 (“If the public believes that the game is unfair and chooses 
not to play, the markets will suffer and the efficient allocation of capital will be impeded.”). This 
is a classic “lemons market” as first described by George Akerlof. According to Akerlof, in a 
market in which buyers do not know which cars are worth their asking price and which are not 
(that is, the lemons), the buyer will simply treat all cars like lemons. The result will be that worthy 
car sellers will leave the markets, unable to get an accurate price for their products, and lemon 
sellers will remain in the market. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 48 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970). The characteristics of 
lemons markets have also been laid out in more recent scholarship: 
[A] lemons market exists when four conditions are fulfilled: (1) the products on the 
market vary significantly in the extent to which they have certain properties . . . and 
buyers regard products with the properties in question as having less expected value 
than those without them; (2) there is an asymmetry of information where buyers cannot 
discriminate between products with the properties and those without, but sellers can at 
least partially distinguish them; and furthermore, (3) there is no reliable signal of 
quality . . . however, (4) buyers know there is a mix of products on the market. 
Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Vulnerable Software: Product-Risk Norms and the Problem 
of Unauthorized Access, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 45, 83–84 (2012). 
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markets would discount all information and transactions.44 The 
connection to market efficiency is clear. If investors refuse to 
participate in the markets, this will make the markets less liquid 
because there are fewer traders, which in turn makes prices less 
accurate and the markets less efficient. Consequently, although market 
integrity deals with the less-defined concept of fairness, it is crucial to 
efficient capital allocation. 
Manipulation adversely impacts market integrity because it allows 
bad actors to exploit other traders in the markets. Market manipulators 
are able to profit at the expense of others, not owing to diligence, 
research, or luck, but rather because of an unfair advantage.45 To the 
extent that investors perceive the markets as unfair, they limit the 
capital they invest in the markets. Indeed, when investors question the 
integrity of the markets, there is a dearth of capital available within the 
markets as a whole, as was evidenced after the corporate frauds of 
Enron46 and WorldCom were exposed.47 Maintaining market integrity 
and the perception of fairness in the markets is critical to the proper 
functioning of the financial markets.48 Thus, effective regulation 
addressing market manipulation must consider both the harm the 
conduct has on the integrity of the market and notions of fairness. 
 
 44. See Dionigi Gerace et al., Stock Market Manipulation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 
8 AUSTRALASIAN ACCT., BUS. & FIN. J. 105, 136 (2014) (“Manipulation is also associated with 
increased volatility and reduced volume as investors exit the market rationally in fear of trading 
with a manipulator.”); Haft, supra note 28, at 1051 (“[T]aking advantage of inside information 
that is unavailable to other parties is inherently unequitable. . . . [I]nsiders unfairly obtain benefits 
from and damage the public investor on the other side of the trade.”). 
 45. See Tom C.W. Lin, supra note 40, at 1281 (stating that “the goal of . . . market 
manipulation is to distort the natural price of certain financial instruments or transactions to the 
benefit of the manipulative party”). 
 46. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1359 (2011) (“Enron failed to appreciate the risk that 
a fall in the value of its merchant assets could be coupled with a significant fall in the price of 
Enron stock used as collateral, and that the firm would collapse as a result.”). 
 47. EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 212 (2005) (“Such misallocation of resources has a 
detrimental effect for the economy as a whole, and this can be witnessed by the dearth of capital 
available for investment that followed the recent stock bubble and the eruption of the Enron, 
WorldCom, Adelphia, and other corporate frauds.”). 
 48. See Haft, supra note 28, at 1051 (“If the public believes that the game is unfair and 
chooses not to play, the markets will suffer and the efficient allocation of capital will be 
impeded.”); Margotta, supra note 42, at 14 (“[G]reater market integrity will lead to security prices 
that more closely reflect the value of securities.”). 
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B. Defining Market Manipulation 
One of the primary difficulties in dealing with market 
manipulation is the absence of an agreed-upon definition.49 Securities 
and commodities laws and regulations do not define illegal 
manipulation. Instead, the Acts prohibit specific conduct—such as 
fictitious trades—and generally harmful conduct—such as fraud, 
deception, and price manipulation.50 To some, the lack of a definition 
is a grave oversight of lawmakers and is the reason for the confusion 
that exists in the law of market manipulation.51 But given that “[t]he 
methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the 
ingenuity of man,”52 any definition of illegal manipulation must be 
capacious enough to evolve with the markets, while still establishing 
meaningful boundaries as to what conduct is considered 
manipulative.53 
In defining illegal manipulation, courts have largely relied on 
vague notions of price artificiality and on willful market misconduct 
 
 49. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of 
Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 289 n.16 (2013) 
(“‘[M]anipulation’ and ‘manipulative’ are terms of art that the Supreme Court has long narrowly 
construed to exclusively cover practices ‘intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting 
market activity.’ Hence, neither ‘contrivance’ nor ‘manipulative’ in Section 10(b) add much, if 
anything, to its coverage.” (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977))); 
Amanda N. Miller, Securities and Commodities Manipulation: Is There a Principled Reason to 
Distinguish the Two?, 17 PIABA BAR J. 1, 1 (2010) (“Congress did not define the term 
‘manipulation’ under [the CEA nor the Exchange Act], thus leaving it to the courts to define 
securities and commodities manipulation.”); Tālis J. Putniņš, Market Manipulation: A Survey, 26 
J. ECON. SURVS. 952, 953 (2012) (“There is no generally accepted definition of market 
manipulation . . . . Legal definitions are often intentionally not explicit, and much of the finance 
and economics literature uses the term market manipulation in an imprecise manner.”). 
 50. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6c (2012) (prohibiting the use of a fictitious sale in the purchase or 
sale of any commodity to distort the “bona fide price” of such commodity); 15 U.S.C. § 78j 
(prohibiting the use of any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the sale or 
purchase of any security); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 872 (2003) (“The two most 
prominent mechanisms [of an increased federal role in corporate governance] are the periodic 
disclosure requirements under section 13 and the antifraud provisions and concomitant liability 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).  
 51. See, e.g., Edward T. McDermott, Defining Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: 
The Futures “Squeeze,” 74 NW. U. L. REV. 202, 205 (1979) (calling manipulation law “an 
embarrassment—confusing, contradictory, complex, and unsophisticated”). 
 52. JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
MARKET MANIPULATION 147 (2014). 
 53. As one court opined, “Congress’ decision to prohibit manipulation without defining it 
apparently arose from the concern that clever manipulators would be able to evade any legislated 
list of proscribed actions or elements of such a claim.” In re Soybean Futures Litig., 892 F. Supp. 
1025, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
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that impacts price. For example, the Supreme Court has stated, 
“‘Manipulation’ is ‘virtually a term of art when used in connection with 
securities markets.’ The term refers generally to practices . . . that are 
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”54 
The Court has also stated that manipulation “connotes intentional or 
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling 
or artificially affecting the price of securities.”55 Accordingly, the Court 
has given meaning to the scienter requirement by way of the “statutory 
authorization for the main antifraud prohibitions in the securities 
laws . . . [mandating] intentionality, something more than 
negligence.”56 Similarly, in interpreting manipulation under the CEA, 
one court stated: “[T]he test of manipulation must largely be a practical 
one . . . . The aim must be therefore to discover whether conduct has 
been intentionally engaged in which has resulted in a price which does 
not reflect basic forces of supply and demand.”57 
Some scholars have attempted to be more precise in their 
definitions of manipulation. For example, Matthijs Nelemans defines 
manipulation in relation to the effect the conduct has on the price of 
the asset, but he does not refer to this as an “artificial price,” as the 
courts do, because of the supposed difficulties in determining when a 
price is artificial.58 To Nelemans, manipulation is conduct that creates 
an extraneous or improper effect on price.59 Other scholars define 
manipulation as an abuse of market power that improperly impacts 
market price.60 Most notably, Professors Thomas Lee Hazen and Philip 
 
 54. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 476–77 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 55. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (citation omitted).  
 56. Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter 
Requirement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 53 (Stephen Bainbridge ed., 
2013) (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185). 
 57. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971). John George Smith, too, 
described manipulation as involving price artificiality and willful misconduct:  
“Manipulation” is a vague term used in a wide and inclusive manner, possessing varying 
shades of meaning, and almost always conveying the idea of blame-worthiness 
deserving of censure. There is usually also an implication of artificiality and of skilful 
and ingenious management . . . . [I]ts most common use . . . [is] in such a way as to give 
outsiders the impression that such buying or selling is the result of natural forces. 
JOHN GEORGE SMITH, ORGANISED PRODUCE MARKETS 109–10 (1922).  
 58. See generally Matthijs Nelemans, Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation, 42 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 1169 (2008) (describing how manipulation creates extraneous or improper “price 
pressure”). 
 59. Id. at 1175.  
 60. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral 
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 161 (2002) (“[M]anipulation is 
concerned less with the immediate victim than the integrity of the market.”). 
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McBride Johnson define price manipulation as “the elimination of 
effective price competition in a market for cash commodities or futures 
contracts (or both) through the domination of either supply or demand, 
and the exercise of that domination intentionally to produce artificially 
high or low prices.”61 
Despite their substantive differences, from a structural standpoint, 
most definitions of manipulation are quite similar. All the definitions 
aim to capture the wrongfulness of manipulation in terms of deliberate 
conduct, nonnegligent behavior, deception, artificial market 
conditions, misleading information, fraudulent actions, or some 
combination thereof. Thus, attempts to define manipulation frame the 
misconduct as both intentional and harmful. Undoubtedly, these 
definitions differ in what constitutes harm and how the harm ought to 
be measured or identified. But structurally, market manipulation is 
based on the trader’s scienter and the harm she inflicts on the market—
both of which are necessary. 
This Article adopts this structural approach to manipulation—
conduct must be both intentional and harmful to the market to satisfy 
any definition of manipulation. Notably, this Article views harm in 
relation to the goals of anti-manipulation laws. Meaning, conduct is 
harmful if it either (1) impedes the markets’ efficiency, such as through 
interfering with price accuracy or negatively impacting liquidity, or (2) 
impairs the markets’ integrity, such as through unfair practices that 
exploit the markets or other traders. As explained in the discussion of 
anti-manipulation laws below, all traditional understandings of market 
manipulation entail both intent and harm. Open-market manipulation, 
therefore, should be no different. 
C. Anti-Manipulation Laws 
Anti-manipulation laws in the United States are divided between 
the Exchange Act and related regulations,62 and the CEA and related 
regulations.63 Owing to the historical separation of the securities and 
 
 61. 3 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 
1240 (3d ed. 2004). 
 62. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78i (2012) (prohibiting price 
manipulation); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (prohibiting fraud and manipulation in the securities 
markets); SEC Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2018) (codifying the prohibitions of 15 U.S.C. § 78j against fraud-based 
manipulation). 
 63. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 6c (2012) (prohibiting manipulative and 
disruptive trading strategies); 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012) (prohibiting manipulation and false 
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commodities markets, their anti-manipulation provisions have evolved 
along different paths. But with the convergence of these markets, there 
have been efforts in recent years to have the anti-manipulation regimes 
of the two markets mirror each other as closely as possible.64 The Acts 
broadly proscribe three categories of manipulative behavior: (1) fraud 
and misstatements, (2) fictitious trades, and (3) price manipulation. 
1. Fraud and Misstatements.  Fraud and misleading statements are 
the least controversial form of market manipulation, likely owing to 
their common law roots. The best-known anti-manipulation provision 
is  section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which grants the SEC broad 
authority to prohibit “manipulative and deceptive devices and 
contrivances” in relation to the purchase or sale of a security.65 Based 
on section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which prohibits 
fraud, deception, and material misstatements.66 Thus, manipulation 
came to be viewed as a species of fraud, and the law developed 
accordingly.67 The case law applying and interpreting section 10(b) and 
 
information); CFTC Prohibition Against Manipulation, 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2018) [hereinafter Rule 
180.1] (codifying prohibitions of 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) against fraud-based manipulation); CFTC 
Prohibition Against Manipulation, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2018) (codifying prohibitions of 7 U.S.C. § 
9(3) against price manipulation). 
 64. See, e.g., U.S. CFTC & U.S. SEC, A JOINT REPORT OF THE SEC AND THE CFTC ON 
HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION 51–54 (Oct. 16, 2009), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/
files/stellent/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/opacftc-secfinaljointreport101.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FUS4-BCH7] (identifying areas in which the Commissions’ anti-manipulation 
laws diverge); see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 50–51 (2009), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF6A-
DDYF] (requesting that the Commissions identify areas of differing regulations and recommend 
statutory amendments that would eliminate these differences).  
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.  
 66. Rule 10b-5 reads:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
  (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
  (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
  (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,  
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.  
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 67. See John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1307, 1366–69 (1981) (explaining that the historical impetus for section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 was the need for a federal prohibition against common law fraud in the securities markets).  
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Rule 10b-5 imported the principles of common law fraud into the law 
of manipulation.68 To allege a claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant made a 
material misstatement or omission or used a fraudulent device, (2) she 
did so with scienter (that is, intent), (3) her conduct was related to the 
purchase or sale of a security, (4) the plaintiff relied on the 
misstatement, and (5) the plaintiff was harmed.69 
Unlike the SEC’s section 10(b) authority, Congress only granted 
the CFTC fraud-based anti-manipulation authority in 2010.70 Section 
6(c)(1) of the CEA and Rule 180.1 are almost mirror images of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and they prohibit the same conduct.71 By 
 
 68. See id. at 1367–68.  
 69. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation 
omitted); see also United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368–69 (1991) (explaining that to 
establish a claim under 10b-5, the Government must prove that the defendant’s purpose was to 
affect the price of the security through his transactions, and that the defendant was not acting 
merely with “the intent to invest”); James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of the Unjust 
Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L. J. 345, 358 (2010) (noting that a Rule 10b-5 claim requires (1) 
“a misrepresentation or omission” that is (2) “material . . . [or] significant to the market or 
investors” and (3) is “‘in connection with’ a securities transaction” (citations omitted)).  
 70. Specifically, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S. Code), amended section 6(c) of the CEA to provide that:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, or attempt 
to use or employ, in connection with any swap, or a contract of sale of any commodity 
in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered 
entity, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance, in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission shall promulgate . . . . 
7 U.S.C. § 9(1).  
 71. Notably, the CFTC has solidified the expansive scope of the provision, stating that 
because section 6(c)(1) of the CEA prohibits manipulative devices in addition to deception, it is 
a market-manipulation provision, as opposed to simply an anti-fraud provision. See 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 180.1 & 180.2. Rule 180.1 states in relevant part: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with any 
swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or contract for 
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, to intentionally or 
recklessly: 
   (1) Use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
   (2) Make, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made not untrue or misleading; 
   (3) Engage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; or, 
   (4) Deliver or cause to be delivered, or attempt to deliver or cause to be 
delivered, for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce, by any 
means of communication whatsoever, a false or misleading or inaccurate report 
concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect 
the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, knowing, or acting in 
reckless disregard of the fact that such report is false, misleading or inaccurate. 
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modeling Rule 180.1 on Rule 10b-5, the CFTC signaled its 
incorporation of decades of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence and 
interpretation.72  
2. Fictitious Trades.  Another form of market manipulation over 
which there is little or no controversy is fictitious trading. Fictitious 
trades create the illusion that there is more trading in a stock than there 
is in fact.73 When a trader or a group of traders acting in concert trade 
assets—with no actual change in ownership—the result is an increase 
in the apparent volume of transactions in the assets.74 Examples of 
fictitious trades include wash sales and matched orders, schemes in 
which traders execute sham transactions with a known, prearranged 
counterparty to move an asset’s price by giving the appearance of 
liquidity. 
Both section 9(a)(1) of the Exchange Act and section 4c(a)(1) of 
the CEA prohibit trades that do not result in a change in beneficial 
ownership or that are with a prearranged counterparty.75 In either 
scenario, the trader does not face real financial risk, and the 
transactions artificially inflate the volume of trading associated with 
the asset, thereby affecting the price.76 Again, the transactions involved 
in this form of manipulation impede the operation of the markets, 
thereby harming the markets’ allocative and pricing efficiency. 
Because of the complete absence of any legitimate justification for 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, no violation of this subsection shall exist where 
the person mistakenly transmits, in good faith, false or misleading or inaccurate 
information to a price reporting service.  
Id. § 180.1(a). 
 72. The CFTC’s incorporation of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence has been explicit: 
Given the similarities between CEA section 6(c)(1) and Exchange Act section 10(b), 
the [CFTC] deems it appropriate and in the public interest to model final Rule 180.1 
on SEC Rule 10b-5. To account for the differences between the securities markets and 
derivatives markets, the [CFTC] will be guided, but not controlled, by the substantial 
body of judicial precedent applying the comparable language of SEC Rule 10b-5. 
Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive 
Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,399 (July 14, 2011) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180). 
 73. 8 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 81:14 (4th ed.) (“[F]ictitious trades create a false 
impression of increased trading activity, thereby creating an impression of greater liquidity in the 
market for the commodity or future or suggesting that important news is soon to come.”). 
 74. Id. (explaining that “wash trades . . . are fictitious, prearranged sales in which the same 
parties agree to a pair of offsetting trades for the same commodity, at no economic risk or net 
change in beneficial ownership”). 
 75. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78i. 
 76. See JOHN L. TEALL, FINANCIAL TRADING AND INVESTING 337 (2013). 
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fictitious trades, this behavior is universally decried as improper and 
illegal.77 
3. Price Manipulation.  Price manipulation is explicitly prohibited 
in both Acts. Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act prohibits 
transactions that affect the price of a security for the purpose of 
inducing another to buy or sell the security.78 The SEC, however, has 
not made much use of this provision, opting instead to rely on section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 to prosecute manipulation. 
Section 6(c)(3) of the CEA also outlaws the direct or indirect 
manipulation of the price of a commodity or swap.79 Prior to the 2010 
amendments to the CEA, price manipulation was the primary anti-
manipulation provision available to the Commission.80 As such, unlike 
the SEC, the CFTC has had to rely heavily on this provision to address 
market manipulation. 
The elements of price manipulation include both intent and harm. 
To successfully allege price manipulation, a plaintiff must show that: 
(1) the defendant possessed an ability to influence market prices; (2) 
an artificial price existed;81 (3) the defendant caused the artificial price; 
 
 77. See Gregory Scopino, Do Automatic Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price 
of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for Improper Trading Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 67 
FLA. L. REV. 221, 263–64 (2015) (discussing the unlawfulness of transactions that are 
noncompetitive or that are believed to facilitate noncompetitive trading under section 4c(a) and 
discussing Congress’s desire to outlaw trading schemes that give the appearance of trading in an 
open market while negating the risk of price competition in that market). 
 78. Section 9(a)(2) states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of the mails or any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, or any member of a national securities exchange . . . [t]o effect, 
alone or with 1 or more other persons, a series of transactions in any security registered 
on a national securities exchange, any security not so registered, or in connection with 
any security-based swap or security-based swap agreement with respect to such security 
creating actual or apparent active trading in such security, or raising or depressing the 
price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security 
by others. 
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2). 
 79. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (prohibiting “directly or indirectly, [the] use or employ . . . in connection 
with any swap, or a contract of sale of any commodity . . . [of] any manipulative or deceptive 
device”). 
 80. Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Commodity Market Manipulation: A Survey, 5 J. 
COMMODITY MKTS. 1, 13 (2017) (“In 2010, believing that the CEA’s existing anti-manipulation 
provisions were inadequate, Congress added language to the law as part of Dodd-Frank that 
effectively incorporated the anti-manipulation provisions of the Securities Act . . . .”). 
 81. An artificial price is a price that does not reflect basic forces of supply and demand. In re 
Ind. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, Inc., No. 75-14, 1982 WL 30249, at *7 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 17, 1982). 
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and (4) the defendant specifically intended82 to cause the artificial 
price.83 The requirement that the plaintiff prove both specific intent 
and price artificiality is the reason the SEC has avoided pleading price 
artificiality to prove manipulation84 and, more notably, the reason the 
CFTC, in its 40-year history, has notched only a single successful 
prosecution of price manipulation.85 
*   *   * 
The above discussion of the relevant anti-manipulation provisions 
confirms the structural definitional requirements identified in Part I.B. 
Yet, in pursuing claims of open-market manipulation, the 
Commissions have ignored the requirement for harm, focusing 
exclusively on intent. Their approach has resulted in significant 
confusion and discord in the markets, as participants try to determine 
what constitutes open-market manipulation. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING OPEN-MARKET MANIPULATION 
 Open-market manipulation does not involve misstatements, 
fraud, fictitious trades, or deceit; the transactions are permissible and 
involve no objectively bad acts.86 In the absence of traditional forms of 
 
 82. The specific intent element is satisfied if the defendant “acted (or failed to act) with the 
purpose or conscious object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the market that did 
not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and demand.” Id. 
 83. See Anthony Candido, Freedom to Trade in the Age of Heightened Market Protection, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 3, 2016), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2016/04/03/freedom-to-trade-in-the-age-of-heightened-market-protection 
[https://perma.cc/794P-2CJ2] (summarizing CFTC’s four-part test).  
 84. See Multer, supra note 15, at 115 (explaining that under Rule 10b-5, a trader can be held 
liable for market manipulation based on her intent). 
 85. In 2009, the CFTC prosecuted its first price manipulation case under the CEA—a victory 
after almost 30 years of the Commission’s existence. See generally DiPlacido v. CFTC, 364 F. 
App’x 657 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing a CFTC decision on price manipulation and addressing issues 
of first impression within the case). This does not include the settlements for manipulation that 
the Commission has secured over the decades.  
 86. Abel Ramirez, Jr., Are Short Sellers Really the Enemy of Efficient Securities Markets? A 
Discussion of Misconceptions After the Financial Crisis, 42 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 38 (2014) (noting 
that open-market manipulations are “accomplished by using entirely legitimate transactions, but 
[are] still subject to enforcement under Rule 10b-5 if the intended effect is ‘a false pricing signal 
to the market.’” (citation omitted)). One scholar has described this distinction between traditional 
and open-market forms of manipulation as follows: 
[T]raditional manipulation involves conduct that is “inherently or otherwise illegal, 
such as fictitious transactions” . . . whereas open-market manipulation consists of 
facially legitimate transactions that make the fraud harder to detect. Claims of open-
market manipulation allege attempts to “increase the price of a security or commodity 
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misconduct, the Commissions and private plaintiffs have alleged that 
open-market trades are manipulative because of the manipulative 
intent of the trader.87 This framing of open-market manipulation, 
however, does not articulate how the transactions harm the market, 
which is key to identifying manipulative activity. 
Part II addresses the first question this Article poses: Can 
legitimate transactions distort the markets? To begin, this Part 
explores the mechanics of open-market manipulation, categorizing 
these schemes into two categories: naked and covered open-market 
manipulation. Using case studies, Part II demonstrates that traders can 
and do use open-market transactions to distort the market. Part II also 
highlights the inadequacies of the Commissions’ intent-centric focus, 
given its inability to coherently articulate how open-market trades 
distort—that is, harm—the markets. 
A. The Mechanics of Open-Market Manipulation 
1. Typology: Naked and Covered Manipulation Schemes.  Open-
market manipulation can be accomplished through naked or covered 
schemes.88 Both forms aim to profit from an asset’s price movement, 
but each scheme accomplishes the goal differently. Naked open-
market manipulation schemes (“naked manipulation”) distort the 
 
by trading, and to sell at a profit before the price returns to its ‘correct’ level.” 
Tara E. Levens, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High-Frequency Trading and Securities Class Actions, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (2015) (citations omitted). 
 87. Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1053 
(2016) (“The hallmark of actions to pursue fraud and manipulation lies in the requirement to 
show that defendants intended to lie or to deliberately alter prices in securities markets . . . . 
Authorities must adduce evidence of manipulative intention (scienter) to artificially distort price 
formation.” (citation omitted)); see also Michael A. Asaro, ‘Masri’ and Open-Market 
Manipulation Schemes, 239 N.Y. L.J. ONLINE (2008), available at https://www.akingump.com/
images/content/1/2/v4/1243/07005080021AkinG.pdf [https://perma.cc/65YU-9TNU].  
 88. Some scholars refer to open-market manipulation broadly as trade-based manipulation. 
This author believes that the classification of open-market manipulation as naked or covered 
better aligns with and describes the conduct at issue. See Multer, supra note 15, at 97–98 
(“Manipulative schemes are referred to as ‘open market manipulations’ when the alleged scheme 
is accomplished solely through the use of facially legitimate open market transactions. . . . [It does 
not involve] any conduct that is inherently or otherwise illegal, such as fictitious transactions, wash 
sales or by disseminating false reporting.”); Michael J. Aitken, Frederick H. deB. Harris & Shan 
Ji, Trade-Based Manipulation and Market Efficiency: A Cross-Market Comparison 1(Nov. 18, 
2009) (draft) (available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=
10.1.1.629.2355&rep=rep1&type=pdf) [https://perma.cc/7XA5-Q2XC] (providing that “Allen 
and Gale (1992) define trade-based manipulation as a trader attempting to manipulate a stock 
price simply by buying and then selling (or vice versa), without releasing any false information or 
taking any other publicly observable action designed to alter the security’s value”). 
FLETCHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  5:10 PM 
2018] LEGITIMATE YET MANIPULATIVE 503 
market only through transactions.89 Any profit the manipulator earns 
from a naked manipulation scheme is from transactions executed on 
the open market.90 In short, the trader must buy the asset at a low price 
and be able to sell it at a high price.91 The trader, then, profits on the 
difference between the low purchase price and the high sale price.92 
Naked manipulation is difficult because as the trader tries to buy low, 
her purchases will, in theory, increase the price of the asset.93 Likewise, 
as she tries to sell at the increased price, her sales will decrease the 
price.94 To be successful in a naked manipulation scheme, the trader 
must have some way of preventing the price from increasing as she 
purchases, decreasing as she sells, or both. 
In covered open-market manipulation schemes (“covered 
manipulation”), on the other hand, a manipulator trades to trigger 
payments or rights in a separate contract or financial instrument, the 
pricing of which is affected by the trades.95 In short, covered 
manipulation involves open-market trades executed to impact the 
trader’s interest in a separate, but related, obligation. A 
straightforward example is a company executive whose bonus is tied to 
the company’s stock reaching a contractually established price 
threshold. Suppose the executive trades in her company’s stock to exert 
 
 89. Nelemans, supra note 58, at 1169 (“Trade-based market manipulation . . . is thought of 
as trading shares specifically to cause a price change.”). 
 90. Fischel & Ross, supra note 18, at 523 (stating that in “[t]hese schemes . . . the trader’s 
profit results directly from the trades”). 
 91. Id. at 512. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Jerry W. Markham, Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims, 13 
COMMODITIES REG. § 15:3 (Apr. 2018) (noting that traders have used manipulative maneuvers 
such as storing commodities to establish a scarcity and create favor for themselves, but that such 
maneuvers make it more difficult to “bury the corpse”); see also Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Guojun 
Wu, Stock Market Manipulations, 79 J. BUS. 1915, 1916 (2006) (“[B]y purchasing a large amount 
of stock, a trader can drive the price up. If the trader can then sell shares and if the price does not 
adjust to the sales, then the trader can profit. Of course, we should expect that such a strategy 
would not work.”); Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The 
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. REG. 281, 293 (1991) [hereinafter Markham, Manipulation] 
(explaining that someone who corners the market will need to “bury the corpse”—that is, dispose 
of the actual commodity used in the corner without significantly depressing prices—and that 
otherwise, she must forfeit the value of the corner). 
 94. Markham, Manipulation, supra note 93, at 293.  
 95. See, e.g., Fischel & Ross, supra note 18, at 523 (describing what they call “contract-based 
manipulation,” wherein “the trader’s profit results from his ability to trigger a contractual right 
or benefit by trading. An example would be purchases by a corporate officer that raise the price 
of his firm’s shares . . . sufficient[ly] to trigger a bonus clause in his compensation package based 
on the firm’s stock price”).  
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upward pressure on its price. The increased stock price would trigger 
her bonus rights, and the executive would profit from her employment 
contract. The executive’s conduct is an example of covered 
manipulation because of the connection between her trades and her 
contractual bonus payment. 
Covered manipulation schemes are more complex and oftentimes 
use derivatives to profit from the price-moving effect of their trades. A 
derivative is a financial product that derives its value from the change 
in value of an underlying asset or from the occurrence of an external 
event.96 Derivatives allow traders to profit from an asset’s changed 
value without the need to own the asset itself. Derivatives can be linked 
to equities; commodities, such as wheat, corn, or oil; or rates, such as 
foreign exchange rates or interest rates.97 Derivative instruments 
include forwards, futures, options, and swaps—each of which can be 
combined with additional features to increase their complexity and 
malleability.98 Derivatives have become commonplace in the financial 
markets and are useful tools for risk mitigation and exposure.99 An 
 
 96. William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From 
Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 815 (2013) (“[D]erivatives 
are contracts that specify payments based on the performance of external securities; the parties 
to the derivative need not own the securities referenced.”); Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Hazardous 
Hedging, supra note 5, at 824  (“A derivative is a financial instrument whose value derives from 
changes in the value of an underlying asset or external event, such as a rainfall, inflation, or a 
natural catastrophe.” (citations omitted)); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 
2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) (“Derivatives are literally bets—agreements 
between parties that one will pay the other a sum of money that is determined by whether or not 
a particular event occurs in the future.”). 
 97. See generally Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1929 
(2017) [hereinafter Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation] (discussing the intersection between 
benchmark manipulation and derivatives using interest rates, foreign exchange, and crude oil); 
Kimberly Amadeo, Derivatives, Their Risks and Their Rewards, BALANCE (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-derivatives-3305833 [https://perma.cc/GVC7-2WJE] 
(“Derivatives are often used for commodities, such as oil, gasoline, or gold. Another asset class is 
currencies, often the U.S. dollar. There are derivatives based on stocks or bonds. Still others use 
interest rates, such as yield on the 10-year Treasury note.”). 
 98. A forward is an obligation to buy or sell the underlying asset at a specified price on a 
future date. A future is a standardized forward that is traded on an exchange. An option is the 
right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an asset on a specified date, at a specified price. And 
“[s]waps are agreements between two counterparties to exchange a series of cash payments for a 
stated period of time.” Michael Chui, Derivative Markets, Products and Participants: An 
Overview, in 35 IFC BULLETINS 5 (2012); Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging, supra note 96, at 825–26 
(discussing that all derivatives have two foundational building blocks—options and forwards). See 
generally Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, supra note 97 (discussing the use of derivatives in 
benchmark manipulation).  
 99. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 1363 (“[F]irms can transfer credit risk through 
products such as swaps or other derivatives.”). 
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equity call option, for example, grants the purchaser the right to 
purchase a specified number of shares on a specified date.100 A call 
option is valuable if the trader believes that the equity’s price will 
increase in the future. For example, suppose that a trader believes that 
Snap Inc.’s stock will rise once the company releases its quarterly 
earnings reports on March 31, 2018. Let us assume that today, Snap 
Inc. is trading at $14 per share. The trader executes call options giving 
her the right to purchase 100 shares of Snap Inc. at $15 per share on 
April 1, 2018—the strike date. If prior to the strike date, the value of 
Snap Inc.’s stock rises to $20 per share, then the options are “in the 
money,” that is, profitable. The trader would exercise her options and 
earn a profit of $500. If, however, Snap Inc.’s shares do not go above 
$15 per share, the options are “out the money,” and the options would 
expire, worthless. Derivatives, therefore, are inextricably bound to 
both the commodities and futures markets, as their valuation is directly 
linked to the assets on which they are based. 
Covered manipulation schemes exploit the connection between 
derivatives, on the one hand, and the commodities or securities—or 
both—markets, on the other, by trading in the latter to affect the price 
of the former. To continue with the equity call option example above, 
assume that as the strike date approaches, Snap Inc.’s stock does not 
rise above $15 per share. Not wanting her options to expire out the 
money, the trader enters the market and purchases a large number of 
Snap Inc. shares, pushing the price upwards. The upward price pressure 
changes the profitability of her options contract, which in the absence 
of her open market trades, would have been worthless. Importantly, in 
contrast to a naked manipulation scheme, the trader in this covered-
manipulation scheme does not need to sell her Snap Inc. shares to 
benefit. If she successfully exerts upward pressure on Snap Inc.’s 
shares, her options would be in the money and profitable, without her 
ever selling shares on the market. Derivatives, therefore, enable 
manipulators to avoid the market forces that would limit or eliminate 
their ability to profit from open-market manipulation. 
2. Common Strategies.  Open-market manipulation schemes 
typically employ certain trading strategies to move the price of the 
 
 100. Tom Prieto, Tax Strategies for Long-Short Equity, 93 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 118, 120 
(2014) (“One party to the equity option pays a premium to another party for the right, but not 
the obligation, to purchase or sell stock . . . . An equity call option is for the purchase of stock and 
an equity put option is for the sale of stock.”). 
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asset for the trader’s benefit. These trading strategies are not per se 
impermissible, but they usually attract the attention of the 
Commissions and private plaintiffs as indicators of market 
manipulation. The two most common strategies implicated in 
allegations of open-market manipulation are “short selling” and 
“marking the close.” 
Generally, traders short sell a security if they believe its price will 
decrease.101 In a security-based short sale, the trader borrows a security, 
sells the borrowed security, repurchases the security after the price has 
fallen, and then returns the borrowed security to its owner.102 The 
trader profits from the difference between the sale and purchase price, 
less any fees she paid to borrow the security. In the commodities 
market, a trader can achieve the same result with derivatives and 
without the need to borrow the underlying asset. For example, suppose 
a trader believes that an upcoming off-shore exploration will result in 
more oil being available, thereby reducing the price of oil in the 
upcoming month. She purchases 100 put options with a strike price of 
$75, which give her the right to sell oil at $75 per barrel before the 
expiration of the option. If the price of oil falls to $65 per barrel, the 
trader is entitled to the difference between the market price and her 
strike price, less any fees paid to purchase the put option.103 Notably, 
the trader earns her profits without ever owning or borrowing a barrel 
of oil; through the put option she is able to gain exposure to the 
decrease in the price of oil without the additional expense of owning 
100 barrels of oil. 
Short selling is not illegal, although there are some who find the 
practice to be objectionable as a form of gambling.104 Aggressive or 
concerted short sales can exert price pressure on asset prices, and the 
Commissions and private plaintiffs have alleged this behavior to be 
manipulative.105 However, as some courts and lawmakers know, short 
 
 101. Short Sales, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm [https://perma.cc/8D6R-
ZD95].  
 102. Id.; see also McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 33, at 1369 (“In a liquid market, 
investors are able to express their negative views by short selling, or by taking a long position if 
they believe there is possibility of appreciation. Through this process, fundamental market value 
is achieved.”). 
 103. In this scenario, her gross profit would be ($75 - $65) x 100 = $1000. 
 104. See, e.g., James J. Angel & Douglas M. McCabe, The Business Ethics of Short Selling and 
Naked Short Selling, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 239, 243–44 (2009) (describing the short-and-distort 
campaigns involved with short selling as objectionable, while categorizing short selling as 
gambling). 
 105. See Sharette v. Credit Suisse Int’l, 127 F. Supp. 3d 60, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding 
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sales can be beneficial to the markets by “contributing to efficient price 
discovery, mitigating market bubbles, increasing market liquidity, 
promoting capital formation, facilitating hedging and other risk 
management activities, and importantly, limiting upward market 
manipulations.”106 The double-edged nature of short sales, therefore, 
makes it particularly important to identify when traders use the 
strategy maliciously, instead of beneficially. 
Another strategy that some consider indicative of open-market 
manipulation is known as “marking the close” or “banging the close.” 
This strategy involves making large transactions at or near the close of 
trading.107 End-of-day trading often has an outsized impact on asset 
pricing, thereby making trades done near the end of closing more 
effective in impacting the asset’s price.108 Additionally, many 
derivatives are valued based on the end-of-day prices of the underlying 
asset, thus making the end-of-day price significant in calculating an 
instrument’s value.109 The possibility, then, of changing the closing 
 
manipulation where the plaintiffs were able to show that Credit Suisse drove down Energy 
Conversion Devices stock prices while short-sale prices significantly rose); GFL Advantage Fund, 
Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 211 (3d Cir. 2001) (involving a defendant that alleged that GFL 
Advantage engaged in market manipulation by depressing stock prices through concentrated 
short sales). 
 106. Press Release, SEC, Statement of Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Short 
Selling and Issuer Stock Repurchases (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
235.htm [https://perma.cc/TG77-V8W7]. 
 107. The CFTC defines “banging the close” as:  
A manipulative or disruptive trading practice whereby a trader buys or sells a large 
number of futures contracts during the closing period of a futures contract . . . in order 
to benefit an even larger position in an option, swap, or other derivative that is cash 
settled based on the futures settlement price on that day. 
CFTC Glossary, CFTC, https://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/
CFTCGlossary/glossary_b.html [https://perma.cc/3UH5-HUTN]; see also Alexander Osipovich, 
Bitcoin Futures Manipulation 101: How ‘Banging the Close’ Works, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2017, 
7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-futures-manipulation-101-how-banging-the-
close-works-1513425600 [https://perma.cc/Z6BB-EWLL] (describing “banging the close” as a 
scenario that “involves pushing around the price of bitcoin when the futures contract expires”). 
 108. See Carole Comerton-Forde & Tālis J. Putniņš, Measuring Closing Price Manipulation, 
20 J.  FIN. INTERMEDIATION 135, 136 (2011) (finding that closing-price manipulation—that is, 
end-of-day trading—causes abnormal day-end returns that are approximately six times larger 
than their usual level and that significantly distorts prices, which is of great consequence due to 
the widespread use of closing prices). 
 109. As an example, suppose a trader holds a call option that gives her the right to purchase 
100 barrels of oil at $75 per barrel. A call option is the right to buy a security at a given price on 
the strike date. Call options are valuable if the option holder believes that the price of the asset 
will rise. Assume that the valuation of the trader’s option—that is, the determination of the final 
price of oil—is linked to the market price on January 31, 2018. If on the strike date, the end-of-
day price of oil is $80 per barrel, she would profit on the spread—$5 per barrel. 
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price of an asset can be quite valuable to covered manipulation 
schemes. However, high volume end-of-day trading is not per se 
manipulative, and there are legitimate reasons for these types of 
transactions.110 Studies have shown that trading in the securities 
markets is heaviest just before the close of the market because traders 
monitor market activity and their positions throughout the day before 
executing their trades.111 Because of the benefits and drawbacks 
associated with this strategy, it is necessary to find a way to delineate 
between traders who execute trades at the end of the day to manipulate 
the market and those who do so for legitimate reasons. Otherwise, the 
markets will operate inefficiently. 
B. Manipulating Openly: Case Studies 
A fundamental issue concerning open-market manipulation is 
whether it is feasible—both on a theoretical and practical level. 
Theoretically, that the defendant is executing permissible trades raises 
the question of whether market manipulation can exist without 
misconduct. Practically, the legitimacy of the transactions seems to 
immunize them from regulatory inquiry. But legitimate, open-market 
transactions can distort the markets. The facial legitimacy of the 
transactions lulls one into believing that misconduct is absent and that 
the transactions are not acts of manipulation. As demonstrated in the 
four case studies below, the misconduct and market distortion stem 
from the negative impact the transactions have on the market, in 
addition to the manipulative intent of the defendant. 
 
 110. This possibility is not reflected in the SEC’s settlement orders, which routinely find 
defendants guilty of market manipulation solely on the basis of marking the close. See, e.g., In re 
Kocherhans, Exchange Act Release No. 36556, 52 S.E.C. 528, 529 (Dec. 6, 1995) (involving a 
defendant who, over a 6-month period, made 47 purchases within 15 minutes of market close in 
the accounts of family members and customers in order to satisfy margin calls); In re Levin, 
Exchange Act Release No. 31124, 50 S.E.C. 1245, 1246 (Sept. 1, 1992) (involving a defendant who 
marked the close during 4 separate periods—ranging from 3 weeks to 2 months—on 2 exchanges 
in order to satisfy margin calls); In re Doherty, Exchange Act Release No. 29545, 50 S.E.C. 624, 
626 (Aug. 12, 1991) (involving defendants who, for a period of four-and-a-half months, placed the 
final order of the day so that the closing price would be impacted by a higher ask price, which 
helped the defendants satisfy margin calls); In re Schaefer, Exchange Act Release No. 13736, 1977 
S.E.C. LEXIS 1302, at *4 (July 11, 1977) (involving a defendant who successfully caused stock to 
close at a price higher than the prior sale price on approximately 253 out of 424 trading days in 
order to increase the value of the defendant’s holdings). 
 111. Fischel & Ross, supra note 18, at 520. 
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1. Naked Price Control: Markowski v. SEC.  Markowski v. SEC112 
presents a quintessential example of naked manipulation and aptly 
demonstrates that it is possible to manipulate the markets using facially 
legitimate transactions. In this case, Global America, Inc. (“Global”) 
underwrote the initial public offering (“IPO”) of Mountaintop 
Corporation.113 For six months thereafter, Global dominated the 
market for Mountaintop’s securities, as the primary purchaser and 
seller, thereby keeping the price artificially high.114 Global’s attempts 
to control Mountaintop’s price ultimately failed, and, notably, once 
Global withdrew from the market, Mountaintop’s securities declined 
by approximately 75 percent in a single day.115 
It was undisputed that all the trades Global executed in 
Mountaintop’s securities were permissible—they were real trades that 
did not involve deceit or misrepresentation.116 The SEC, however, 
argued that the defendants were guilty of market manipulation because 
of their intent.117 To bolster its claim of manipulative intent, the SEC 
highlighted (1) Global’s dominance of the market for Mountaintop’s 
securities118 and (2) the fact that many of Global’s clients invested in 
the IPO and would suffer significant losses if Mountaintop traded 
below its offering price.119 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the 
Commission, finding that the defendants’ intent to manipulate the 
markets was sufficient, on its own, to hold them liable for market 
manipulation.120 Although the court’s holding feels correct given the 
 
 112. Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 113. Michael Markowski and Joseph Riccio Enjoined From Manipulating the Markets for the 
Securities of Three Companies, SEC NEWS DIG., Mar. 4, 1996, at 1–2, https://www.sec.gov/
news/digest/1996/dig030496.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9Z3-HAKN]. 
 114. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 4, Markowski v. SEC, 537 U.S. 819 (2002) 
(No. 01-1749), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2002/01/01/2001-1749.resp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GNU5-K5X8] (describing Global’s after-market trading in Mountaintop’s 
securities). According to the SEC, Global supported the price of Mountaintop’s securities both 
by (1) maintaining high bid prices (that is, offers to buy) and (2) purchasing all unwanted 
securities and absorbing them into its inventory. Markowski, 274 F.3d at 527.  
 115. Markowski, 274 F.3d at 527. Indeed, Global’s attempt at propping up Mountaintop’s 
prices ultimately resulted in $1.4 million in losses and the demise of Global. Id. at 527–29. 
 116. See id. at 528 (“Global’s bids and trades in this case were ‘real’—they involved real 
customers, real transactions, and real money . . . .”). 
 117. See id. at 530 (presenting the SEC’s position that Global purchased Mountaintop 
securities with the purpose of maintaining the security’s apparent market price). 
 118. Id. at 527.  
 119. See id. at 530 (“[A trader for Global] said that he maintained Global’s bids because he 
feared a drop in price and the customer complaints it would generate.”). 
 120. Id.  
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havoc the defendants wreaked on the market, it is disconcerting that 
the sole stated basis for liability was the defendants’ manipulative 
intent. A defendant’s intent is salient to demonstrating the 
purposefulness of her actions, but intent is inadequate as an 
explanation of why otherwise legitimate transactions are manipulative. 
2. Multiparty Scheme: United States v. Mulheren.  United States v. 
Mulheren121 provides a poignant example of how covered manipulation 
may be accomplished through the coordinated efforts of multiple 
parties. John Mulheren, a market trader, and Ivan Boesky, a 
businessperson and banker, had a longstanding business relationship 
in which the two shared market information and trading tips.122 Boesky 
acquired 4.9 percent of the outstanding stock of Gulf & Western 
Industries, Inc. (“G&W”) as the first step in a proposed leveraged 
buyout of the company.123 After G&W rejected his acquisition offer, 
Boesky offered to sell his shares back to the company at $45 per share, 
which was slightly above the current trading price of the company’s 
stock.124 G&W stated that it was only willing to repurchase the shares 
at market price.125 
The day after his conversation with G&W, Boesky called 
Mulheren and stated, among other things, that “it would be great” if 
G&W traded at $45 per share.126 Shortly after his conversation with 
Boesky, Mulheren placed a series of purchase orders for a total of 
75,000 shares of G&W, all within a 10-minute span.127 At the beginning 
of Mulheren’s trading, G&W traded at $44.75; by the end of 
Mulheren’s trading, G&W shares traded at $45 per share.128 Within 
minutes of G&W’s shares reaching $45, Boesky sold his entire 
ownership stake back to G&W at $45 per share.129 At the end of trading 
 
 121. United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 122. Id. at 366.  
 123. Id. A leveraged buyout is the acquisition of another company, in which primarily debt is 
used to fund the cost of acquisition. See, e.g., Leveraged Buyout, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a leveraged buyout as “[t]he purchase of a publicly held 
corporation’s outstanding stock by its management or outside investors, financed mainly with 
funds borrowed from investment bankers or brokers and usu. secured by the corporation’s 
assets”). 
 124. Mulheren, 938 F.2d at 366.  
 125. Id. at 367. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 367–68. 
 128. Id. at 368. 
 129. Id. 
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for the day, however, G&W shares fell to $43.625, and Mulheren’s firm 
lost $64,406 on his G&W purchases.130 Notably, the decrease in G&W’s 
price was in stark contrast to the security’s usual price change; the 
decrease represented a price variance over 10 times what was 
customary.131 
The SEC charged Mulheren with market manipulation in 
violation of Rule 10b-5 on the basis that he intended to manipulate the 
markets when he purchased G&W shares.132 Mulheren’s concentrated 
purchase orders—executed after his conversation with Boesky—that 
caused G&W’s share price to increase were all indicative of an intent 
to manipulate, according to the SEC.133 The Second Circuit rejected the 
SEC’s allegations, finding that the Commission did not prove 
Mulheren’s subjective intent to manipulate, nor did the Commission 
prove that the transactions lacked an investment motive.134 Notably, in 
rejecting the SEC’s manipulation claim, the Second Circuit seemed to 
be looking for anything akin to market harm—fictitious trades, fraud, 
or even an artificial price.135 By relying on manipulative intent, the SEC 
failed to demonstrate how and why Mulheren’s transactions were 
manipulative, and, consequently, the Commission was unsuccessful.136 
3. Last-Minute Trading: SEC v. Masri.  SEC v. Masri137 presents 
another example of covered manipulation and, again, highlights the 
shortcomings inherent in the Commissions’ intent-centric theory of 
liability. Moises Saba Masri was an active securities trader, typically 
making thousands of trades each year.138 Masri sold put options on over 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 367–68 (indicating that between October 16, 1985, and October 17, 1985, G&W 
stock moved from $44.75 to $44.875 and then to $45 at different times of the day, but that on 
October 17, 1985, G&W common stock closed at $43.625 after the defendants sold a large amount 
of G&W common stock). For a discussion of price volatility, see infra Part III.B. 
 132. See id. (“The government’s theory of prosecution in this case is 
straightforward[:] . . . [W]hen an investor, who is neither a fiduciary nor an insider, engages in 
securities transactions in the open market with the sole intent to affect the price of the security, 
the transaction is manipulative and violates Rule 10b–5.”). 
 133. See id. at 369 (discussing the SEC’s theories of Mulheren’s manipulative intent). 
 134. Id.  
 135. See id. at 370–71 (stating that traditional indicia of manipulation are missing from the 
alleged manipulation scheme, such as fictitious trades, matched orders, wash sales, etc.). 
 136. See id. at 372 (“[I]n the absence of other indicia of manipulation—and there are none—
the fact that Mulheren dominated the market between 9:30 a.m. and 11:10 a.m. on October 17, 
1985 . . . carries little weight.”). 
 137. SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 138. Id. at 363.  
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800,000 shares of T.V. Azteca S.A. de C.V. American Depositary 
Receipts (“TZA”) with a strike price of $5 per share that expired on 
August 21, 1999.139 As the exercise date approached, TZA share prices 
began to decline, approaching $5 per share and eventually dropping 
below $5.140 On August 20, Masri purchased 200,000 shares of TZA 
stock in the last 10 minutes of trading, moving TZA’s price from below 
$5 to $5.125 per share.141 Had TZA’s shares remained below $5, Masri 
would have been required to spend $4.3 million to purchase the put 
options.142 Instead, in response to his blitzkrieg trading, TZA share 
price rose, and the options expired worthless, sparing Masri from 
incurring any losses.143 Notably, Masri’s trades accounted for 94 
percent of all TZA purchases in the last hour of trading and 75 percent 
for the day.144 
In alleging that Masri was guilty of open-market manipulation, the 
SEC inferred Masri’s manipulative intent from the “timing, size, and 
incremental execution” of the trades, among other things.145 Masri 
asserted that his trades were economically rational and were motivated 
by other unexpired options he held on TZA stock.146 After a careful 
analysis of the matter, the court held that liability for open-market 
transactions can be imposed if the plaintiff proves that “but for the 
manipulative intent, the defendant would not have conducted the 
transaction.”147 The court recognized Masri’s explanation for his trades 
as plausible but refused to grant his motion to dismiss because the 
SEC’s evidence of intent, albeit weak, was sufficient.148 Interestingly, 
although speaking in the language of “manipulative intent,” the court 
was in search of evidence that Masri’s conduct harmed the market by 
 
 139. Id. at 363–65. A put option gives the holder the right, but not obligation, to purchase the 
underlying asset at the strike price on the agreed-upon date (known as the strike or exercise date). 
See Fletcher, Hazardous Hedging, supra note 5, at 825 (defining an option). In this case, Masri 
sold put options on TZA, which meant that if the buyer of the put option chose, Masri would be 
obligated to buy TZA shares at five dollars per share on the strike date. As the put seller, Masri 
expected the price of TZA to increase. If the price of TZA fell below five dollars per share, Masri 
would be obligated to pay more for the shares than its market price.  
 140. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 364–66. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 366. 
 143. Id. at 365–66. 
 144. Id. at 365. 
 145. Id. at 373. 
 146. Id. at 373–75. 
 147. Id. at 372.  
 148. Id. at 375. 
FLETCHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  5:10 PM 
2018] LEGITIMATE YET MANIPULATIVE 513 
“‘artificially’ affecting the price of the security or injecting inaccurate 
information into the market.”149 In the absence of evidence of harm to 
the market or other market participants, the court was unwilling to 
impose liability, despite the defendant’s admittedly suspicious 
conduct.150 
4. Guaranteed Profits: CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors.  CFTC v. 
Amaranth Advisors151 is a case in which the government successfully 
held the defendants liable for open-market manipulation. As part of an 
archetypal covered manipulation scheme, the Amaranth defendants 
executed open-market trades to ensure the profitability of related 
derivatives.152 Amaranth Advisors (“Amaranth”) was a hedge fund, 
specializing in natural gas trading, that had approximately $9 billion of 
assets under management.153 On two separate occasions in February 
and April 2006, Amaranth accumulated a substantial number of gas 
futures contracts that traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(“NYMEX”).154 On the final day of trading, during the last 30 minutes, 
Amaranth flooded the NYMEX natural gas markets with offers to sell 
its gas futures.155 In the last 4 minutes of trading, Amaranth was 
responsible for 99 percent of all trading in the asset.156 Amaranth also 
held a large position in natural gas swaps.157 The profitability of 
Amaranth’s swaps depended on the decrease of natural gas prices on 
the NYMEX.158 In sum, Amaranth marked the close on the NYMEX 
gas futures which benefitted its position on natural gas swaps that were 
valued by reference to the NYMEX gas closing price. 
The CFTC charged Amaranth and its principal trader, Brian 
Hunter, with attempted price manipulation.159 Relying on Hunter’s text 
 
 149. Id. at 373. 
 150. Id. at 375. 
 151. CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 152. Id. at 525. 
 153. LLOYD DIXON, NOREEN CLANCY & KRISHNA B. KUMAR, HEDGE FUNDS AND 
SYSTEMIC RISK 34 n.10 (2012). 
 154. Amaranth, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 530. 
 155. Id. at 527 (“Less than half an hour before the closing range, Hunter disclosed his trading 
strategy to another trader . . . .”). 
 156. See id. 
 157. A commodity swap is a derivative “in which the payout to at least one counterparty is 
based on the price of a commodity or the level of a commodity index.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 158. Id. at 528. 
 159. The CFTC did not have the authority to bring non-price-manipulation cases in 2006. Id. 
at 525. 
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messages in which he articulated a clear intent to manipulate the 
NYMEX, the CFTC was able to easily demonstrate manipulative 
intent.160 Importantly, the CFTC also provided evidence of how the 
transactions undermined the markets, which was key to the 
Commission’s successful prosecution. In light of the defendants’ stated 
manipulative intent and the evidence of market injury, the court found 
Amaranth and Hunter guilty of market manipulation.161 In its analysis, 
the court focused on the fact that Hunter’s trades disrupted the 
markets because the deluge of last-minute orders could not be filled 
before the close of trade.162 The court also noted that Amaranth 
improperly favored its swaps’ profitability by marking the close to 
depress the NYMEX closing price.163 In sum, Amaranth’s conduct was 
manipulative because the defendants possessed the intent to 
manipulate and because their trades injured the markets and exploited 
their counterparties. 
Importantly, Amaranth highlights the need for analytical clarity, 
particularly in instances of open-market manipulation. The court said 
it was only looking at manipulative intent and overt acts, regardless of 
the legality of the acts. Yet, the court’s analysis considered the impact 
of the defendant’s transactions on the market. The court’s and the 
CFTC’s approach here is laudable because it considered the impact of 
the defendants’ conduct on the market in deciding whether the 
legitimate transactions were manipulative. However, conflating the 
analysis of intent with that of market impact exacerbates the confusion 
over what the law requires before a trader may be held liable for open-
market manipulation. 
*   *   * 
Market manipulation is feasible through open-market 
transactions, as demonstrated from the case studies above. The 
Commissions and private parties have achieved varying degrees of 
success in proving that, mostly because of their singular focus on the 
intent of the trader as the basis of liability. In relying solely on intent, 
plaintiffs limit their ability to hold perpetrators accountable for open-
market manipulation because intent does not explain why facially 
 
 160. Id. at 532–33. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 528.  
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legitimate transactions are manipulative.164 As analyzed in greater 
detail in Part II.C, below, the intent-centric theory of liability is 
incomplete, and it is an insufficient regulatory tool in combatting open-
market manipulation. 
C. The Insufficiency of Intent 
The practical and conceptual difficulties inherent in open-market 
manipulation make it tempting to rely on the “know it when you see 
it” standard.165 In some ways, reliance on intent seems to adopt such a 
measure, but this approach does not make it clear to the markets when 
legitimate conduct may result in liability. Under the current approach 
to open-market manipulation, intent plays an outsized role in 
determining liability; this enforcement approach neither makes the 
markets safer nor adequately proscribes open-market manipulation. 
The exclusive reliance on intent short-circuits lawmakers’ attempts to 
curb, and plaintiffs attempts to successfully prosecute, open-market 
manipulation because (1) intent is both over- and underinclusive and 
(2) intent does not explain how or why legitimate transactions distort 
the markets. 
1. Scope of intent.  The scope of the intent-centric approach to 
open-market manipulation is both too broad and too narrow, making 
it ineffective in combatting market manipulation. It is underinclusive 
because of the inherent difficulty of proving intent.166 Rarely is direct 
evidence of a defendant’s manipulative intent available. In the 
financial industry, it is even less likely that such proof would be 
available because of the disinclination of members of highly regulated 
industries to commit incriminating information to writing.167 Absent 
 
 164. Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of 
Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381, 383, 392 
(2005) (explaining that corporate directors’ independence is important to corporate 
accountability, and that shareholder derivative suits generally allege a breach of fiduciary duty). 
 165. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (setting the 
standard for pornography as “I know it when I see it”). 
 166. See Huang, supra note 18, at 6 (“[T]he difficulty of proving the intent requirement is 
[a] . . . main reason[] for the introduction of civil penalties to the market manipulation regime in 
the 2001 [Australian securities law] reform. It had [previously] been argued . . . that intention was 
too difficult to prove and this had impeded successful market manipulation prosecutions.” 
(citation omitted)); cf. Loke, supra note 18, at 21 (“There is much that is problematic with Fischel 
and Ross’ thesis. While there is some truth to the notion that ‘it is extremely difficult to discern 
the intent of a trader with objective evidence’, objective evidence does not consist merely of the 
impact of the trade.”). 
 167. This is not always the case. In the Amaranth case discussed supra Part II.B.4, the 
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explicit or direct proof of a trader’s intent to manipulate, plaintiffs and 
fact finders must infer intent from circumstantial evidence. Plaintiffs 
routinely rely on trading patterns such as trade size, volume, and 
timing.168 Yet, given the permissibility of traders’ actions in cases of 
open-market manipulation, these factors are all subject to 
interpretation.169 
The evidentiary burden associated with intent is further increased 
by the ability of traders to explain their legitimate transactions in a 
nonmanipulative manner, particularly ex post.170 Courts are likely to 
err on the side of caution when interpreting equivocal evidence of 
manipulative intent in open-market manipulation cases, particularly in 
the absence of market harm.171 Indeed, the intent-alone-is-enough 
standard may increase the difficulty of proving open-market 
manipulation, to the detriment of the wider markets. The legitimacy of 
the trades, the ambiguity of the evidence of intent, and the reluctance 
of the courts to base liability solely on intent all combine to decrease 
the likelihood of successfully proving open-market manipulation under 
this standard. Hinging the provability of manipulation solely on intent 
means that most instances of manipulation will go unpunished. The 
problematic nature of intent, therefore, hampers regulators’ ability to 
adequately address this form of manipulation, effectively leaving 
abusive market behavior unchecked. 
Conversely, the intent standard is overinclusive because it 
includes transactions for which the trader had a manipulative intent, 
but which did not harm the market. A trader, for example, may execute 
trades, hoping and wishing that they create a momentary distortion in 
 
defendant provided emails and instant messages to the CFTC as part of the agency’s investigation. 
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 3, CFTC v. Amaranth 
Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 07 Civ. 6682 (DC)), 2007 WL 4403879. 
 168. SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining that open-market 
manipulation allegations often include transactions with suspicious timing, high volume, or a 
pattern of prior manipulation).  
 169. Indeed, what plaintiffs consider to be evidence of manipulative intent may be construed 
as a defendant’s unbridled exuberance. See, e.g., Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (“It may be hard to separate a ‘manipulative’ investor from one who is simply over-
enthusiastic, a true believer in the object of investment.”).  
 170. See, e.g., Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 372–74 (involving a defendant who provided ex post 
explanations for his suspicious transactions to justify them as legitimate, nonmanipulative trades). 
 171. See generally ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint that the defendants were manipulating the price of its 
common stock by converting preferred stock into common stock, since the complaint’s lack of a 
connection between the stock price and the defendants’ actions constituted a failure to adequately 
plead the scienter requirement).  
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price. Despite her intentions and her legitimate transactions, however, 
suppose that she fails to manipulate the market. Per the Commissions’ 
approach, such conduct still constitutes market manipulation because 
of the trader’s intent. Yet, in this scenario, no matter how explicit the 
intent of the trader, if her trades did not harm the market, she should 
not be liable for market manipulation. Admittedly, this is an extreme 
example, but it demonstrates that imposing liability exclusively on the 
basis of the intent of the trader can have inappropriate results that do 
not improve the markets. 
Furthermore, the overbroad nature of the intent standard can 
have a chilling effect on beneficial market conduct. A component of 
market liquidity is the existence of traders who hold different beliefs 
about the price of an asset or the future trajectory of the markets.172 
Traders’ ability to express their divergent opinions through their 
transactions is essential to establishing an equilibrium in the markets 
and fostering market liquidity, both of which contribute to market 
efficiency.173 Grounding claims of manipulation solely on intent, 
particularly when the proof is circumstantial, may deter traders from 
engaging in beneficial market activity out of fear of liability. Traders 
may exit the markets to avoid penalization for their legitimate 
transactions that, ex post, may be construed as manipulative—a net 
negative result for the markets. 
2. Intent is not harm.  The intent to manipulate is a crucial aspect 
of imposing liability for open-market manipulation,174 but alone, intent 
is an incomplete basis. A trader’s manipulative intent is important in 
proving that her conduct was not accidental or negligent and, as such, 
that the trader is blameworthy. The legitimacy of the transactions in 
open-market manipulation schemes does not render the trader’s 
behavior immune from liability; however, it must be demonstrated that 
her conduct caused harm. Otherwise, the trader would be punished for 
her bad intent alone. This defies basic criminal law theory that one is 
 
 172. See Laura E. Hughes, The Impact of Insider Trading Regulations on Stock Market 
Efficiency: A Critique of the Law and Economics Debate and a Cross-Country Comparison, 23 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 479, 495 (2009) (explaining that in a liquid market, shares are bought 
and sold easily, but that in an illiquid market, a seller might be unable to sell a stock since all 
buyers believe that the price is unfairly low or that it would be irrational to sell the stock). 
 173. Global Financial Markets Liquidity Study, PWC (Aug. 2015), https://www.pwc.se/sv/pdf-
reports/global-financial-markets-liquidity-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9X9-46NP]. 
 174. Multer, supra note 15, at 106 (explaining the role of intent in cases of open-market 
manipulation).  
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not punished merely for a criminal state of mind, but that one’s actions 
must be criminal as well to warrant punishment.175 The intent to 
manipulate without proof of market harm—such as injury to the 
proper functioning of the markets—is an inadequate basis for liability. 
An exclusive focus on manipulative intent conflates scienter with 
misconduct. For some acts, bad intent transforms otherwise legitimate 
conduct into criminal conduct.176 For example, if someone follows 
another person innocently because they happen to be going in the same 
direction, this is not a criminal act. But if someone follows another with 
the intent to harm or intimidate them, this is stalking. In transforming 
otherwise legal behavior into a criminal act, the intent and the effect of 
the actor’s conduct are important. The same must be true for open-
market manipulation. Both the intent of the trader’s behavior and the 
effect her conduct has on the market are necessary if facially legitimate 
transactions are to be found manipulative. This comports with the 
purpose of anti-manipulation laws—to protect the markets from 
abusive behavior because it undermines the proper functioning of the 
markets. A cogent theory of open-market manipulation must frame 
liability in terms of the intentionality of the trader’s conduct and the 
negative impact the conduct has on the market. 
In sum, intent is an insufficient basis for delineating between 
legitimate transactions and manipulative transactions. Intent is also an 
insufficient basis for protecting the markets from open-market 
manipulation. Alone, intent neither provides a coherent basis for 
liability, nor effectively punishes open-market manipulation. Including 
harm in the liability analysis is the most effective mechanism for 
classifying a transaction as manipulative, despite its being facially 
legitimate. 
 
 175. John M. Darley & Thane S. Pittman, The Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive 
Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 324, 325 (2003) (arguing that the defendant’s 
punishment should be proportional to “the wrongness of their actions in inflicting the original 
harm”).  
 176. See Daniel Waldman, Has the Law of Manipulation Lost Its Moorings, MONDAQ (Apr. 
7, 2017, 3:50 PM), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/585174/Commodities+Derivatives
+Stock+Exchanges/Has+The+Law+Of+Manipulation+Lost+Its+Moorings [https://perma.cc/ 
HBQ7-YU3E] (describing intent as paramount to a manipulation charge because “absent 
conduct that is fraudulent or by its very nature price-distorting, ‘it is the intent of the parties which 
separates otherwise lawful business conduct from unlawful manipulative activity’” (citation 
omitted)); see also Langevoort, supra note 56, at 4 (noting that while intent is a debated term, 
with respect to trading, “scienter means that the insider must have deliberately taken advantage 
of—that is, used—the information for personal gain,” and that the “bad act” is stripped of its 
intentionality absent proof of scienter). 
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III.  A HARM-BASED APPROACH 
In light of the feasibility of open-market manipulation and the 
shortcomings of the intent-centric approach, Part III turns to the 
second question this Article poses: On what basis can legitimate 
transactions be considered manipulative? As alluded to above, liability 
for open-market manipulation ought to require proof of the trader’s 
manipulative intent and the harm her transactions imposed on the 
market. Part III begins by analyzing the importance of including 
market impact in analysis of open-market manipulation. This Part goes 
on to analyze how open-market manipulation undermines the goals of 
anti-manipulation laws and regulations by impairing market efficiency 
and integrity. Part III also considers whether there is a role for market 
discipline in proscribing and punishing open-market manipulation. 
Finally, Part III puts forward suggestions to improve the detection and 
enforcement of open-market manipulation. 
A. Why Harm Matters 
The Commissions, courts, and plaintiffs have struggled to identify 
open-market manipulation because they fail to intellectually wrestle 
with whether and how facially legitimate transactions harm the market. 
Harm is a necessary component for determining whether legitimate 
transactions are, in fact, illegal acts of market manipulation. By not 
engaging with the question of how open-market manipulation harms 
the market, lawmakers risk going beyond their stated goals, needlessly 
interfering with the markets, and chilling socially beneficial conduct. 
Identifying how trades harm the markets requires thinking about harm 
not only in terms of affirmative conduct, but also as market impact.177 
A trader who deliberately executes facially legitimate transactions that 
negatively affect the markets is as responsible for her actions as 
someone who issues a fraudulent statement to affect the price of an 
asset. In both instances, the trader’s conduct harms the market, but 
because the former uses legitimate transactions, some courts do not 
impose liability. Traders ought to be held responsible for the impact of 
their conduct on the markets, regardless of the methodologies they 
used. This Article’s proposed harm-based analysis provides a basis for 
 
 177. Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 533, 551 (2002) (“To the extent the market price reacts to the recommendations of [rating] 
analysts, the ability to engage in selective disclosures may therefore affirmatively reduce the 
accuracy of stock market prices.” (citation omitted)). These inaccurate stock prices harm the 
efficiency and liquidity of the market. 
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alleging misconduct based on the negative impact the transactions had 
on the markets. 
In determining whether legitimate transactions injure the markets, 
vague notions of harm do not suffice. Rather, reference must be made 
to the goals of anti-manipulation laws. Specifically, to the extent that 
legitimate trades impair market efficiency and market integrity and are 
executed with the requisite manipulative intent, they ought to be 
deemed manipulative from a legal standpoint because they are 
functionally the same as traditional forms of manipulation. Failure to 
punish such behavior has perverse results on the markets because it 
encourages traders to aim for the same market impact but allows them 
to avoid liability if their manipulative acts are legitimate transactions. 
However, just as harm is necessary for liability, so is intent. Open-
market trades that harm the market despite being done without the 
requisite intent ought not be punished. Negligent trading that impairs 
the markets’ efficiency is not market manipulation, and failure to hold 
a trader liable in such cases would likely not impede market integrity.178 
A harm-based approach, which requires both manipulative intent 
and market harm, treats the legitimacy of the trades for what it is—a 
distraction. This approach seriously engages with the negative impact 
that permissible conduct can have on the market. Including harm in the 
analysis, therefore, provides a cogent framework through which one 
can be held liable for open-market transactions that manipulate the 
markets. 
B. Identifying Harm to the Markets 
Open-market manipulation harms both market efficiency and 
market integrity. This Section analyzes how legitimate transactions 
may nonetheless distort market prices, and it highlights specific market 
conditions that may enable a trader to commit open-market 
manipulation. This Section also analyzes how open-market 
manipulation causes the markets to be unfair, thereby weakening 
market integrity, and it discusses the contours of unjust wealth 
transfers as a basis of liability. 
1. Market Efficiency.  The most obvious harm open-market 
manipulation schemes may inflict on the markets is the impairment of 
 
 178. The markets are not risk free. Mistakes are possible; if trading that harms the market is 
merely the result of a mistake or negligence, liability for market manipulation should not be 
imposed.  
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market efficiency. Market actors expect to execute trades at prices that 
are undistorted, even if not necessarily accurate, reflections of the 
current economic value and future-earnings expectations of the 
asset.179 Traders can use open-market transactions to weaken market 
efficiency by creating an artificial price for an asset.180 The facially 
legitimate nature of the transactions in open-market manipulation 
seems incongruous with a claim of price distortion. This is not correct; 
even with legitimate transactions, asset prices may be made artificial. 
As seen in the case studies, facially legitimate trades may be used to 
interfere with the markets’ pricing ability, thereby contributing to a 
distorted price. To the extent that a trader’s conduct distorts market 
pricing, her transactions harm market efficiency and, consequently, are 
manipulative. 
Key to understanding how open-market trades can create an 
artificial price is disabusing oneself of the notion that price artificiality 
requires illegal conduct. To equate artificiality with illegality is to 
needlessly circumscribe the types of behavior that distort the market.181 
There are two prevailing approaches to identifying price artificiality. 
One approach views an artificial price as one that is not established by 
the forces of supply and demand.182 The phrase “supply and demand” 
 
 179. SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he purpose of securities law 
[is] to ‘prevent practices that impair the function of stock markets in enabling people to buy and 
sell securities at prices that reflect undistorted (though not necessarily accurate) estimates of the 
underlying economic value of the securities traded.’” (citing In re Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. Litig., 
322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))). 
 180. Supra Part II.  
 181. Charles Mills & Karen Dildei, The Necessity of Price Artificiality in Manipulation and 
Attempted Manipulation Claims, 37 FUTURE & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1, 8 (2017) (“As the CFTC 
stated, ‘when a price is effected by a factor which is not legitimate, the resulting price is necessarily 
artificial. Thus, the focus should not be as much on the ultimate price, as on the nature of the 
factors causing them.’” (citation omitted)).  
 182. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Revolution in 
Manipulation Law: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical 
Analyses, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 357, 370 (2013) (“An artificial price is one that does not ‘reflect 
basic forces of supply and demand.’”(citation omitted)); Benjamin E. Kozinn, The Great Copper 
Caper: Is Market Manipulation Really a Problem in the Wake of the Sumitomo Debacle?, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 243, 261 (2000) (“[A] price is artificial when it ‘does not reflect the market or 
economic forces of supply and demand . . . .’” (citation omitted)); Mills & Dildei, supra note 181, 
at 4 (explaining that price artificiality conveys that the market does “not reflect the legitimate 
forces of supply and demand” (citation omitted)); Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of 
Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 370 (1987) (“Another 
approach defines artificial price as a price that does not reflect the ‘basic’ or ‘legitimate’ forces of 
supply and demand.” (citation omitted)); Colleen Powers, Note, Filling the Regulatory Void in the 
FX Spot Market: How Traders Rigged the Biggest Market in the World, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
139, 163 (2016) (“An artificial price is one that does not ‘reflect basic forces of supply and 
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refers not only to the aggregate manifestations of the market, but also 
to other market factors, including general market expectations about 
the price of the asset, unexpected external events such as natural 
disasters or changes to government policy, and historical market 
behavior, among other things.183 The second definitional approach to 
price artificiality considers whether the price deviates from the 
historical, expected price of the asset.184 In determining whether a price 
is distorted, courts consider the dollar price, the spread between the 
cash and futures markets, or the spread in the markets from one month 
to the next.185 
Determining whether a price is artificial requires detailed 
econometric analysis that is beyond the scope of this Article.186 As such, 
this Article accepts both definitions of price artificiality, since their 
 
demand.’” (citation omitted)). This definition of price artificiality is not without its critics. See, 
e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets, 59 
J. BUS. S103, S117 (1986) (“An effort to isolate which ‘forces of supply and demand’ are ‘basic’ 
and which are not is doomed to failure.”). 
 183. See MARK LOVEWELL, UNDERSTANDING ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVE 35 (6th ed. 2012) (“The five main demand factors are the number of buyers in a 
market, their average income, the prices of other products, consumer preferences, and consumer 
expectations about future prices and incomes.”); id. at 40 (“The six main supply factors are the 
number of producers, resource prices, the state of technology, changes in nature, the prices of 
related products, and producer expectations. Once again, with each factor, we must assume that 
all other factors remain constant.”); see also Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire 
Squid: Regulating Securities Markets After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 342 
(2011) (noting that investors’ expectations distort trading interactions and increase risk involved 
in transactions, which generally shifts the supply and demand curve). 
 184. Perdue, supra note 182, at 367 (“[A]n artificial price is one that is historically unusual, 
either because of its absolute level or because of its relationship to other prices.”).  
 185. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1167–70 (8th Cir. 1971) (accepting the 
Government’s three tests for establishing price distortion in the wheat futures market: (1) a record 
increase in price of the future by 18.625 cents, (2) the spread between the May and July wheat 
futures in 1963 experienced a record increase compared to the previous nine years, and (3) “the 
May 1963 futures price was considerably out of line with the Kansas City futures price as 
compared with these prior years”). From a practical and theoretical standpoint, assessing the 
“normal” price is an inquiry plagued with difficulties. Indeed, because of the scope of this 
question, methodology is limited (1) to those instances in which manipulation causes a change in 
price that is significant enough to deviate from historical patterns, and (2) to those assets that 
have a long history of being heavily traded. See David B. Kramer, The Way It Is and the Way It 
Should Be: Liability Under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Thereunder for Making 
False and Misleading Statements as Part of a Scheme to “Pump and Dump” a Stock, 13 U. MIAMI 
BUS. L. REV. 243, 296 (2005) (“[T]hose stocks that are heavily traded . . . are less likely to be 
affected by such misleading or false information. This is due to the fact that the market quickly 
corrects itself due to the large number of investors and the vast amount of coverage such stocks 
receive.”).  
 186. See Abrantes-Metz, Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 182, at 357 (proposing the use of 
econometric screens to determine price artificiality). 
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difference is only in mechanics, not in substance. As the case studies 
above demonstrate, it is possible to create an artificial price via 
legitimate transactions. The case studies also highlight factors that 
oftentimes indicate that a price may be distorted instead of being the 
product of the natural forces of supply and demand. The three primary 
market conditions that may suggest that facially legitimate trades are 
being used to distort asset prices are (1) market domination, (2) market 
volatility, and (3) market illiquidity. The existence of any of these 
factors, whether singularly or collectively, is not per se proof that a 
price is artificial. Rather, their presence should increase scrutiny of the 
legitimacy of the transactions, with the aim of determining whether the 
transactions contributed to or caused a distorted price and were, 
therefore, manipulative. 
a. Market Domination.  One indicator of whether facially 
legitimate trades created an artificial price is the level of control the 
trader has over the market.187 Market control occurs when a trader or 
traders working together acquire a monopoly stake, or a close 
approximation, in the supply or demand of physical commodities, 
securities, or other financial contracts.188 The trader, then, can use her 
market power to dictate the price of the asset.189 Possessing a 
controlling position in an asset is not per se illegal, and indeed there 
are instances in which an entity holds a natural monopoly position in a 
market.190 The issue, therefore, is not merely possession of a controlling 
 
 187. See Candido, supra note 83 (“Economic theory . . . holds that purchases or sales in a free 
market will in general have an impact on market price through the natural forces of supply and 
demand. Thus, price influence can be anticipated from an economic standpoint.”). The Candido 
piece also provides that: 
a trader who holds positions in both the futures and physical markets may abstain from 
trading in either or both markets to avoid being accused of trading to affect price. Or, 
a trader who believes prices are low may abstain from taking advantage of this pricing 
inefficiency by trying to buy as much as possible due to a fear of influencing the price.  
Id.  
 188. AVGOULEAS, supra note 47, at 147–48. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id.; see also Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of Natural Monopoly, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 1227, 1232 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Stevan Shavell eds., 2007) (defining a 
natural monopoly as “a firm producing a single homogeneous product . . . when it is less costly to 
produce any level of output of this product within a single firm than with two or more firms”). 
Richard Posner also helpfully defines the natural monopoly:  
If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost by one 
firm rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual 
number of firms in it. If such a market contains more than one firm, either the firms 
will quickly shake down to one through mergers or failures, or production will continue 
to consume more resources than necessary. 
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position, but whether the trader used her position to dictate price—
that is, to corner or “squeeze” the market.191 A trader that acquires 
market control through open-market transactions and abuses her 
power to distort the market is liable for manipulation, despite the 
legitimacy of the underlying transactions. Asset pricing that is the 
result of a cornered market is not market driven and is, therefore, 
artificial. 
Taking price artificiality seriously as an avenue for liability for 
open-market manipulation allows us to reframe instances of open-
market manipulation in terms of the trader’s domination of the market 
and the impact that control had on the asset’s price. When considered 
as such, the harm the facially legitimate transactions had on the market 
is evident—the transactions were used to fix prices that did not reflect 
the market-driven forces of supply and demand. The Markowski case, 
discussed above, provides a salient example. The defendants controlled 
the market, and using their control, they established an artificially 
inflated price for the security.192 The legitimacy of the transactions, in 
such cases, are red herrings that distract from the defendants’ abuse of 
their market power to distort securities prices. To the extent that 
traders utilize their market position to dictate asset prices, there should 
be a strong inference that they have manipulated the markets. 
Price distortion is possible even if the trader’s domination of the 
market is short-lived. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to 
recognize market power that has not been maintained over a period of 
weeks or months.193 In today’s markets, in which assets are owned for 
mere seconds, market control may be established in a shorter time 
 
Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969).  
 191. U.S. courts have identified four main criteria of market power manipulations: (a) the 
existence of a dominant or merely controlling position in deliverable supplies; (b) the existence 
of a dominant or merely controlling position in the futures market for a specific delivery period; 
(c) whether these positions have been built up with manipulative intent; and (d) whether they 
[have distorted] prices in both markets.” AVGOULEAS, supra note 47, at 148. Professor Lin 
explains the difference between corning and squeezing: 
Cornering generally occurs when one or more parties acquire the total supply of a 
financial instrument or commodity and then dictate the market prices of that 
instrument or commodity, thereby manipulating natural price discovery of the 
marketplace . . . . Squeezing generally occurs when one or more parties acquire a 
substantial supply of a financial instrument or commodity and then use their market 
power to manipulate market prices in their favor. 
Lin, supra note 40, at 1281–82 (citations omitted).  
 192. Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
 193. See United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 371 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that market 
domination “must be viewed in light of the time period involved and other indicia of 
manipulation”). 
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period.194 A trader’s controlling position in an asset that lasts for 
minutes or hours may be used to distort the price in that brief window. 
Indeed, given the linkage between asset closing prices and derivatives, 
a savvy manipulator would not need to dominate the price for weeks 
to be profitable; mere minutes would be sufficient. As with long-term 
market domination, the key is to determine whether the market actor 
used her controlling position in the market to improperly distort the 
asset’s price. 
Both Masri and Amaranth are examples of short-term market 
control that contributed to or caused an artificial price in the markets. 
Recall, in Masri, the defendant’s transactions constituted 94 percent of 
all purchases in the asset in the last hour of trading and 75 percent of 
all purchases for the day.195 Masri’s domination lasted only a single day, 
but it was effective; his trades exerted pressure on the asset’s price to 
his benefit, allowing him to profit on his related option contract.196 
Similarly, in Amaranth, the defendants’ market control lasted mere 
minutes; they sold 99 percent of the asset in the last 4 minutes of the 
closing window.197 Through their brief domination of the market, the 
defendants were able to distort the asset’s price, thereby manipulating 
the market. Such extreme market domination, as seen in Masri and 
Amaranth, calls into question whether an asset’s price is set by the 
forces of supply and demand or, rather, by the trader’s controlling 
market position. 
Market domination, therefore, is a strong indicator of price 
artificiality. To the extent that traders use open-market transactions to 
establish dominance and, subsequently, distort the asset’s price, they 
have harmed the market’s pricing efficiency. Market dominance, both 
in the form of monopolistic ownership and relative transaction 
 
 194. See CFTC v. Parnon Energy, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that 
where the defendants acquired 97 percent of the total futures contracts for West Texas 
Intermediate crude oil supply from January 8, 2008, to January 27, 2008, the CFTC sufficiently 
pled the “ability to influence prices” element, since the defendant maintained a dominant position 
in the WTI market); SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that because 
the defendant placed 7 different orders for TZA shares in the last 10 minutes of the day—
amounting to 94 percent of all TZA buy-side activity for the last hour of trading—the SEC raised 
sufficient facts to plead manipulative intent).  
 195. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 365.  
 196. Id. at 364–66. Masri may be compared to corrective traders whose “only goal is to 
discover manipulators and sell shares at the inflated price, thereby trying to minimize the exercise 
of downward supported price pressure and maximize their profit . . . . Informed traders endeavor 
to minimize the supported price pressure and maximize their profit.” Nelemans, supra note 58, at 
1190–91. 
 197. CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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dominance, should result in courts giving those facially legitimate 
transactions greater scrutiny for their potentially manipulative effect 
on asset price. 
b. Market Volatility.  Severe price fluctuations can suggest price 
artificiality.198 Generally, markets experience some level of volatility as 
conditions change, market expectations are revised, and new 
information becomes available.199 Abnormal price swings, however, 
may indicate that the asset’s price is moving further away from its 
fundamental value.200 Studies have shown that manipulated markets 
exhibit higher volatility, as nonmanipulative traders try to respond to 
manipulative trading.201 When traders engage in open-market 
manipulation, they may increase market volatility by exerting 
unsustainable pressure on the price of an asset.202 For example, asset 
 
 198. Regression models can be used to show whether price fluctuations are indicative of price 
artificiality: 
Generally, one should be able to examine the prices of the futures contracts at issue 
through a regression model that has the market fundamental factors as regressors, that 
is, right-hand-side variables. The residuals from this regression model reflect the effect 
on prices of factors unrelated to supply and demand fundamentals. If prices are indeed 
artificial, one will find statistically significant residuals during the alleged manipulation 
period. In other words, the test for statistically significant residuals from a market 
fundamental-based regression is the test for price artificiality. 
Atanu Saha & Hans-Jürgen Peterson, Detecting Price Artificiality and Manipulation in Futures 
Markets: An Application to Amaranth, 18 J. DERIVATIVES & HEDGE FUNDS 254, 257 (2012).  
 199. David C. Donald, Regulating Market Manipulation Through an Understanding of Price 
Creation, 6 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 55, 64 (2011) (“Market manipulation affects the price 
creation process by influencing the price to reflect not just available information about the issuer, 
the relevant securities, and the market, but to a material extent the action of the manipulator. As 
such, manipulation also increases volatility.”). 
 200. Charles R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 523, 578 (2014) (“Legacy order-execution algorithms . . . often use volume as a proxy for 
liquidity, and thus may trigger large price movements where it is a poor proxy. Some may be a 
result of non-manipulative trading strategies whereby HFTs [high-frequency traders] chase short-
term momentum in such a way as to amplify price swings.”); X. Frank Zhang, High Frequency 
Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery 8 (Dec. 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691679 [https://perma.cc/MR33-J947] (“A large number of 
unidirectional trades can create price momentum and attract other momentum traders to the 
stock, a practice that amplifies price swings and thus increases price volatility.”).  
 201. Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 93, at 1942 (“Overall, these results suggest that prior to the 
manipulation, manipulated stocks are unexceptional in terms of returns, but they tend to be more 
volatile. During the manipulation period, manipulated stocks exhibit higher returns, higher 
liquidity, and higher volatility.”). 
 202. See Nelemans, supra note 58, at 1183, 1192–93 (discussing manipulation in terms of 
“unsupported price pressures” that increase market volatility and exacerbate informational 
asymmetries in the market).  
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prices that collapse once a trader has exited the market may signal that 
the price was being artificially supported.203 
Markowski, again, exemplifies this concept. Once the defendants 
could no longer support the price of the security in question, the price 
plummeted by 75 percent in a single day.204 The price decrease in 
Mulheren was much less dramatic but was still an abnormal fluctuation 
in price for the stock. Prior to the defendant’s trading, the security’s 
price changed in small increments of $0.125.205 Yet, after the price 
increased in response to his transactions, the defendant ceased trading, 
and the stock fell by $1.375.206 In both instances, the sharp decline in 
the asset prices was not accompanied by any external news or 
occurrence that explained the volatility; the most significant change 
was that the defendant no longer traded the asset. Such price volatility, 
even when coupled with facially legitimate transactions, should be 
scrutinized as an indicator of possible open-market manipulation, 
particularly in the face of the double harm of market instability and the 
resulting price artificiality. 
c. Market Illiquidity.  A final factor that may indicate that open-
market trades are being used to manipulate the market is whether the 
market is small and illiquid, on the one hand, or robust and highly 
liquid, on the other hand.207 A liquid, efficient market is characterized 
by the ability of traders to execute orders without having the market 
move against them.208 The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and 
 
 203. The opposite is also true—that is, a price that rebounds once a trader exits may indicate 
that the price was artificially depressed. However, it is more likely for manipulators to try to raise 
prices than depress them. See Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 93, at 1920.  
 204. Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 205. United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 367–68 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 206. Id. (indicating that between October 16, 1985, and October 17, 1985, G&W stock moved 
from $44.75 to $44.875 and then to $45 at different times of the day, but that on October 17, 1985, 
G&W common stock closed at $43.625 after the defendants sold a large amount of G&W common 
stock).  
 207. See Nelemans, supra note 58, at 1178 (“[L]arge traders in liquid markets and small 
traders in illiquid markets will sometimes be able to inflate or deflate the price.”).  
 208. Attorney Joseph M. McLaughlin describes market illiquidity as follows: 
In an efficient market, stock prices promptly and accurately reflect publicly available 
information so that an investor who relies on the integrity of the market is also relying 
indirectly on the information. . . . [A]n efficient market absorbs material 
misrepresentations into the price of the security so quickly that the ordinary investor 
cannot make trading profits on the basis of the new information. An inefficient market 
does not. 
JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, 1 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.26 
(14th ed. 2017) (citations omitted); see also Bratton, supra note 23, at 505 (noting that the efficient 
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the NASDAQ are prime examples of efficient markets; many 
securities traded on these exchanges have thousands of traders each 
minute.209 Less-liquid markets include securities traded on the OTC 
Bulletin Boards and the Pink Sheets, where trades may number in 
single digits for a single day.210 Even in the absence of manipulation, 
trades are more likely to have an effect on price in smaller markets 
because there are fewer available counterparties with whom to trade.211 
Trading strategies—such as placing large orders and marking the 
close—have a more significant impact on asset price when the market 
is illiquid.212 For a heavily traded security, moving the price would be 
no small feat. For example, to move stock price of Amazon—which has 
a market capitalization of over $900 billion, average daily trading 
volume of approximately 3 million shares, and a per-share price of over 
$2000213—through open-market trades would require, at a minimum, 
the purchase of 1 percent of the company’s outstanding shares.214 On 
 
capital market hypothesis makes a “modest prediction that prices will follow a random walk and 
that no trading strategy based on public information can systematically outperform the market.”); 
James Peck & Karl Shell, Liquid Markets and Competition, 2 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 362, 363 
(1990) (“We say that a market is liquid if the effect of any individual’s trades on the prices in that 
market is small.”). 
 209. See NASDAQ—Most Active Stocks, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/markets/most-
active.aspx [https://perma.cc/J329-3PJK]. For example, on September 27, 2018, one of the most 
heavily traded securities on the NYSE by share volume was General Electric Company, which 
had over 82 million shares traded. General Electric (GE), YAHOO! FIN., 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GE/history?p=GE&.tsrc=fin-srch [https://perma.cc/YCQ3-
X97Q]. 
 210. See Information for Pink Companies, OTC MKTS., https://www.otcmarkets.com/
corporate-services/information-for-pink-companies [https://perma.cc/9XWX-98V4]. For 
example, on September 27, 2018 one of the more heavily traded securities on the Pink Sheets by 
share volume was Acology, Inc., which had approximately 2 million shares traded. Acology, Inc. 
(ACOL), YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/ACOL/history?p=ACOL&.tsrc=fin-
srch [https://perma.cc/YA7F-YKN7] .  
 211. Charles R. Korsmo, Mismatch: The Misuse of Market Efficiency in Market Manipulation 
Class Actions, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1111, 1147 (2011) [hereinafter Korsmo, Mismatch] 
(noting that in efficient markets, there are sufficient numbers of arbitrageurs that will take the 
other side of a trade, thereby making it nearly impossible for a manipulator to create an artificial 
price).  
 212. Id. at 1145 (“Simply by placing a market purchase order, a would-be manipulator can 
often increase the observed market price by the amount of the spread, which can be significant in 
thinly traded stocks.”).  
 213. These numbers were as of August 5, 2018. Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN), YAHOO! FIN., 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/AMZN/ [https://perma.cc/4YBS-7V3X].  
 214. This l percent formulation has been adopted in the literature: 
As Fischel and Ross point out, “[t]o the extent that the evidence supports the existence 
of a price pressure effect, it indicates that securities have supply and demand elasticities 
no smaller in magnitude than 1.” This means that a manipulator would need to buy at 
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the other hand, a trader may be more effective in moving the price of 
Euroseas Ltd., which has a market capitalization of approximately $14 
million, an average daily trading volume of a little over 3000, and a per 
share price under $2.215 Open-market manipulation schemes are likely 
to be more successful in, and harmful to, illiquid assets because of the 
limited volume of trading. Indeed, the manipulation schemes in 
Markowski and Masri, discussed above, all occurred in smaller, illiquid 
markets. 
Another feature of less-liquid markets is that there is less 
information available about the issuers and the value of the assets 
because of lower disclosure requirements.216 The dearth of information 
means that any information is likely to exert pressure on asset price.217 
High-volume or higher-than-usual volume trades in small, illiquid 
markets communicate information to other traders that either the high-
volume trader has information about the asset or that she is attempting 
to manipulate the price. Studies have shown that open-market 
manipulation is more likely to be successful when other traders do not 
know what motivates large orders.218 This level of information 
asymmetry is characteristic of thinly capitalized markets, and the 
asymmetry amplifies the impact of open-market manipulation and 
increases the likelihood of price distortion. Thus, transactions utilizing 
open-market manipulation strategies in highly illiquid markets warrant 
 
least 1 percent of a company’s outstanding shares—a purchase that would be in the 
billions of dollars for Microsoft—in order to raise the share price by a measly 1 percent. 
Korsmo, Mismatch, supra note 211, at 1147 (citation omitted).  
 215. These numbers were as of August 5, 2018. Euroseas Ltd. (ESEA), YAHOO! FIN., 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/esea?p=esea&.tsrc=fin-srch [https://perma.cc/KKJ2-B2MH]. 
There is no indication that the price of Euroseas has been or is now being manipulated. The 
company was chosen for illustrative purposes only.  
 216. SEC, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 2, 142 (July 31, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6DQ-Y3NN] 
(“Despite its size and importance, the municipal securities market has not been subject to the 
same level of regulation as other sectors of the U.S. capital markets . . . . [T]he municipal securities 
market is relatively illiquid and opaque, with substantially less transparency than the equities 
markets, particularly on a pre-trade basis.”). 
 217. See MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, ASSET PRICING UNDER ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION: BUBBLES, CRASHES, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, AND HERDING 1 (2001) (“Financial 
markets are driven by news and information . . . . This information affects traders’ expectations 
about the uncertain value of an asset.”); Thompson & Sale, supra note 50, at 873 (“[M]andated 
disclosures are detailed and are therefore potential sources of manipulation and fraud.”).  
 218. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Stock-Price Manipulation, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 503, 509 
(1992) (“[A] manipulator who is uninformed can make a profit simply by buying and selling the 
stock.”). 
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greater scrutiny to determine whether the trader should be held liable 
for open-market manipulation. 
2. Market Integrity.  Most insidiously, open-market manipulation 
undermines market integrity because traders use the markets’ 
structure and interconnectedness to effectuate their manipulative 
schemes. Trading in the financial markets is a zero-sum game—each 
trader’s gain comes at the cost of another’s loss.219 Market actors, 
nonetheless, expect that their losses are not because their 
counterparties had an unfair advantage. Traders and the public expect 
that gains are fairly earned from a person’s skill, research,220 or even 
luck. Public perception that the markets are fair is essential to their 
proper functioning. When facially legitimate trades are used to allow a 
trader to profit unfairly, this undermines the markets’ integrity, 
creating the impression that the markets are rigged. Open-market 
manipulation erodes public trust and confidence in the markets by 
facilitating unfairness in the markets under the guise of legitimate 
transactions. 
But what does it mean to say that the markets ought to be fair? Or 
that transactions are unfair? As a regulatory concept, fairness is hazy; 
inserting it into the law of market manipulation may cause more 
confusion than clarity.221 Courts, regulators, and scholars invoke 
 
 219. See JACK L. TREYNOR, Types and Motivations of Market Participants, in ASSOCIATION 
FOR INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT & RESEARCH, EXECUTION TECHNIQUES, TRUE TRADING 
COSTS, AND THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF MARKETS 35, 35 (Katrina F. Sherrerd ed., 1993) 
(“[T]rading is a zero-sum game . . . . Every trade will have one winner and one loser . . . .”); 
William J. Baumol, Speculation, Profitability, and Stability, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 263–64 (1957) 
(“Whatever one group of traders gains another must lose . . . .”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market 
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 733 (1984) 
(explaining that secondary-market trading does not create wealth because one party’s gain comes 
from another’s loss); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets 
Work Too Well: A Cautions Case for a Securities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 261, 272 
(1989) (recognizing that trading is a zero-sum game); Whitehead, supra note 25, at 57–58 
(discussing the zero-sum game that emerges when firms choose to transfer risks related to capital 
raising to a transferee’s shareholders). 
 220. Yet still, “an informed trader generally ignores the loss to uninformed traders from [the 
informed trader’s] decision to engage in information research.” Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, 
Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313, 335 (2002). Further, “[t]he informed 
trader compares a private benefit (the transfer of trading profits) to the private (and social) cost 
of research, but ignores a host of external social costs and benefits that are likely to determine 
whether the informed trading is on balance socially productive.” Id. 
 221. Robert W. McGee, Applying Ethics to Insider Trading, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 205, 210 (2008) 
(“Trade cannot be free, it must be fair, whatever that means.” (citation omitted)); Sale & 
Langevoort, supra note 21, at 777 (“Most would agree that an omission of [some] risk renders the 
advice [provided by lawyers in corporate disclosures] misleading and unfair to the client.”). 
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fairness as a basis for prohibiting certain behavior that as a society we 
deem unacceptable. For example, the grounds for punishing insider 
trading, another form of market abuse, are often phrased in terms of 
fairness—allowing insiders to trade on the basis of material nonpublic 
information is unfair to the corporation to which the insiders owed a 
duty.222 For unfairness to be a meaningful basis for evaluating harm to 
the markets, the notion of fairness must be unpacked as it relates to the 
financial markets. 
Reliance on fairness implicates two principles that are necessary 
for defining its scope as a basis of liability. On the one hand, not all 
unfairness in the market can or should be grounds for liability.223 That 
would make the concept of fairness overbroad, and it would contradict 
the fundamental nature of the markets. On the other hand, trading with 
full knowledge that one’s profits are certain cuts against the honesty 
and integrity of the markets.224 Open-market manipulation, 
particularly covered manipulation, brings both of these considerations 
to the fore. Even in the absence of misconduct or manipulation, traders 
do not have access to the same information.225 Yet, some transactions 
may be unfair, such as when traders create market conditions that 
guarantee their profits or unjustly make it more difficult for other 
 
 222. Early scholarship on insider trading viewed equality of information among public 
investors as an underlying justification of insider-trading laws. See, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN, 
CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 116 (1981); Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, 
Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 359–60 (1988); David Ferber, The Case 
Against Insider Trading: A Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1970); William 
H. Painter, Rule 10b-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 699, 713–14 (1971). 
Similarly, lower courts also initially endorsed this view, believing that insider trading was unfair 
to public investors, in general, because the latter did not have access to the same information prior 
to trading. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[Rule 10b-
5] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors 
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to information . . . .”); Speed v. 
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951), aff’d with modifications as to damages, 
235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). The Supreme Court rejected this broad reading of Rule 10b-5 and 
instead deemed trading on the basis of nonpublic information to be illegal and “unfair” only to 
the extent that the trader owed a duty to the corporation whose shares were traded. It is the 
violation of the duty the trader owed the corporation that makes insider trading unfair to the 
corporation, rather than to the public markets as a whole. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 231–35 (1980).  
 223. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (“[N]ot every instance of financial unfairness constitutes 
fraudulent activity under § 10(b).”) (citation omitted). 
 224. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[B]etting on a ‘sure thing’ 
is anathema to the ideal of ‘fair and honest markets’ . . . .” (citation omitted)), rev’d on other 
grounds, 445 U.S. 222.  
 225. BRUNNERMEIER, supra note 217, at 1 (“[I]n reality different traders hold different 
information.”). 
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traders to profit. Determining the point at which a transaction is not 
“fair,” then, is important for identifying when open-market 
transactions harm the market. 
There are three possible formulations of fairness. First, fairness 
may refer to traders having equal access to information. Under this 
definition, it would be unfair to trade with someone who does not have 
the same information. Such a definition of fairness is inappropriately 
broad and limits all profitability within the markets.226 Analysts, for 
example, contribute to market efficiency by researching assets and 
making educated recommendations on whether to buy, sell, or hold. 
The process by which this information is absorbed into the markets 
facilitates asset pricing. However, if a trader had to inform her 
counterparty of the results of her research before trading, there would 
be no profits to be earned, nor, more importantly, would there be any 
incentives to do research.227 Open-market trades, therefore, cannot be 
harmful simply because a trader appropriately has more information 
than her counterparty. 
A second definition of fairness considers the trader’s ability to 
execute transactions at the “correct” price. Thus, if open-market trades 
improperly affect the asset price, the trades are unfair. Defining 
unfairness in relation to the price of the asset conflates price artificiality 
with harm to market integrity, which ought to be treated as separate 
bases for liability. Price distortion harms market integrity, but a 
definition of fairness should identify how a transaction’s unfairness can 
be an independent basis of liability. Consequently, this definition is an 
unsatisfactory way to frame how open-market transactions harm 
market integrity. 
Third, fairness may refer to the absence of unjust wealth transfers. 
Although trading in financial assets is a zero-sum game, the transfer of 
wealth between parties is expected to be because of the skill or luck of 
the counterparty.228 Arguably, fair markets should provide a parity of 
 
 226. See Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Information-Dissemination Law: The 
Regulation of How Market-Moving Information is Revealed, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1429 
(2016) (discussing the view that “fairness-inspired” reforms that aim to make information 
available to the public would simultaneously leave investors worse off). 
 227. See McGee, supra note 221, at 211 (“What is unfair is to force [individuals] to disclose 
such information to people who have done nothing to earn it.”); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of 
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 991 (2003) 
(explaining that privacy permits individuals to engage in meaningful activities that have positive 
value; that it encourages development; and that without this protection, individuals might not 
engage in such activity). 
 228. See McGee, supra note 221, at 211 (arguing that some people develop more skills or are 
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opportunity between counterparties in the possibility that one may lose 
and the other gain. A transaction is unfair and harms the markets’ 
integrity if it allows one trader to place her thumb on the scale such 
that the playing field is no longer level. This view of fairness rests on 
the reasonable expectations of the parties that their transactions have 
the same likelihood of success or failure. A trader that creates market 
conditions that make her counterparties’ success less likely reduces the 
public’s confidence in the fairness of the markets. This Article adopts 
this third definition of fairness because it best captures how open-
market transactions can be unfair and detrimental to market integrity, 
while limiting the scope of conduct that gives rise to liability for 
covered manipulation schemes. 
In connecting fairness with the parties’ reasonable expectations, 
the scope of liability for harm to market integrity is confined to open-
market transactions in which traders have a contractual relationship. 
In naked manipulation schemes, trades are between anonymous 
counterparties on public exchanges. The absence of a contractual 
relationship between the parties means that they have no expectations 
of each other. And, there is no expectation that traders disclose their 
trading strategies to their counterparties. Thus, claims for open-market 
manipulation based on naked transactions should be limited to claims 
based on harm to market efficiency.229 With covered manipulation, on 
the other hand, the trader has a financial contract or instrument that is 
directly affected by her open-market trades. While counterparties to 
those trades cannot claim unfairness, the counterparties to the contract 
may allege manipulation if the open-market trades were used to 
undermine the reasonable expectations of the parties’ related 
contractual agreement. 
In covered manipulation schemes, the manipulator tilts what 
ought to be a neutral contract or financial instrument into an 
arrangement that benefits her by interfering with the objective 
valuation methods on which the parties agreed. Specifically, in 
derivatives and similar financial instruments, the payout is determined 
with reference to a benchmark or other objective market measure, such 
as the closing price of the asset on a specified day.230 Parties to these 
 
naturally better at something than their competitors, and that those more-equipped people should 
not be penalized by regulation that levels the playing field). 
 229. See infra text accompanying note 253 (explaining reasons for limiting the scope of 
liability for market integrity).  
 230. A benchmark is a price, rate, or index that measures one or more underlying assets, 
prices, or other data based on a formula, value assessment, or market survey. Fletcher, 
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contracts rely on objective valuation methods to ensure that no party 
has control or influence over the means of valuation.231 When a trader 
interferes with the contractual basis of valuation, she diminishes the 
parity of opportunity that these instruments ought to provide for each 
party to the contract. Although a counterparty expects others in the 
markets to act in a self-interested manner, efforts to skew the means of 
valuation undercut counterparties’ reasonable expectations.232 
Recall, Amaranth and its counterparties entered into a swap, 
agreeing on an objective valuation method—the closing price of the 
NYMEX.233 However, upon realizing that the closing price would 
result in significant losses, the defendants executed transactions to 
distort the closing price of the NYMEX, thereby negating the 
objectivity of the agreed-on valuation measure.234 By attempting to 
influence the swaps’ payout, the defendants skewed the transaction to 
their benefit, contradicting the parties’ reasonable expectations. The 
defendants’ gains on the swap agreements, therefore, were unfair 
because they were an unjust transfer of wealth from the swap 
counterparties to Amaranth. Given the unfairness of Amaranth’s 
conduct toward its counterparties and the harm its trades inflicted on 
market integrity, the Amaranth defendants should be liable for open-
market manipulation. Similar assertions regarding unfairness and the 
reasonable expectations of counterparties can be made with respect to 
Masri. 
Maintaining market integrity is foundational to the markets’ 
efficient functioning. Yet, because of the amorphousness of the 
concept of fairness in the markets, lawmakers have shied away from 
using fairness as an independent basis of liability. Undeniably, open-
market manipulation implicates notions of fairness, even in instances 
when pricing efficiency was not harmed, and in instances when that 
harm cannot be proven. Current market structure—in which 
commodities, securities, and derivatives are inextricably linked—
facilitates complex risk strategies, but this structure also makes open-
market manipulation a profitable undertaking. When traders exploit 
 
Benchmark Regulation, supra note 97, at 1930–31. 
 231. Id. at 1944.  
 232. Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the Shifting Balance of State and Federal 
Authority over Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1389, 1414 (2015) (noting that under the Dodd-
Frank Act, “[s]tandardized derivatives must now be cleared and executed through central 
clearinghouses to improve transparency and limit counterparty risk” (citation omitted)).  
 233. Supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text. 
 234. Id. 
FLETCHER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  5:10 PM 
2018] LEGITIMATE YET MANIPULATIVE 535 
market structure and bias market outcomes in their favor, they harm 
the market by robbing other market participants of an equal 
opportunity to participate in a fair market.235 Even if such conduct does 
not result in an artificial price, it does result in unjust wealth transfers, 
which indicates that the transactions impaired market integrity and 
were, therefore, manipulative. 
C. A Role for Market Discipline? 
Before any discussion of what regulatory intervention to identify 
and punish open-market manipulation ought to look like, it is 
necessary to consider whether the market can discipline the 
perpetrators, given that their trades are executed on the open market. 
Although regulations are important to correct market failures like 
market manipulation,236 enforcement actions and private suits may not 
be needed if the markets punish actors for their misconduct. 
Regulatory restraint, in such cases, is more appropriate.237 
In a seminal article on market manipulation, Professors Daniel R. 
Fischel and David J. Ross posit that attempts to manipulate through 
the open market are doomed to fail because the markets will correct 
attempts to distort the price through trades.238 Fischel and Ross argue 
that even if trades move an asset’s price upwards, the price will revert 
to its normal value once the asset is sold on the open market.239 Naked 
manipulation, they assert, is self-deterring because it cannot be 
profitable, and scarce regulatory resources should, therefore, not be 
directed toward it.240 In sum, their argument goes, regulation of open-
 
 235. Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits of Event Studies 
in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553, 560 (2018) (explaining that misrepresentations 
affect stock prices and result in harm to the market).  
 236. Rebecca Söderström, Regulating Market Manipulation: An Approach to Designing 
Regulatory Principles 23 (Uppsala Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 1, 2011) 
https://www.jur.uu.se/digitalAssets/585/c_585476-l_3-k_wps_2011_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ9B-
DXSR] (“The main justification to regulate the activity on the financial markets is to help the 
financial markets perform more efficiently.”).  
 237. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong 
Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1692 n.254 (2002) (explaining how foreign legislation 
“retarded the development of the markets” when enacted in response to price-manipulation 
scandals involving the German commodities markets).  
 238. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 18, at 518 (“[A] manipulator who is able to convince 
market participants that he is informed at the time of purchase must do the opposite at the time 
of sale. If he cannot, he would realize losses even if he were able to sell at the market price.”).  
 239. See id. at 521 (noting that a trader must hope that “prices will fall after he sells and will 
not rise again simultaneously with his subsequent purchases”).  
 240. Id. at 518–19. 
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market manipulation ought to be left to the markets, because market 
forces will correct any price distortion, and because the conduct is 
unprofitable, thereby making it self-deterring.241 However, neither 
claim is persuasive nor correct with respect to open-market 
manipulation, whether naked or covered. Thus, legal intervention is 
needed. 
Certainly, in some of the case studies discussed above, market 
forces were able to correct for trader misconduct. In Markowski and 
Amaranth, the traders’ schemes ultimately led to the demise of their 
respective firms; in Mulheren, the consequences were not as grave, but 
the trader still lost thousands of dollars because of the trade.242 In these 
cases, it could be argued that market discipline worked well because 
the traders paid a high cost for manipulating the markets. Examples of 
such spectacular failures ought to serve as a deterrent for would-be 
manipulators, thereby minimizing the occurrence of such schemes. 
Yet, even if open-market manipulation schemes result in significant 
losses for the trader, that does not mean that there is no role for 
regulatory intervention. Determining whether a particular 
manipulation scheme should be subject to enforcement actions 
requires more than an inquiry into whether the trader profited from 
her scheme.243 
Even ultimately unprofitable schemes impair market efficiency 
and integrity. The inability of the trader to profitably sustain her open-
market scheme does not minimize the impact that her conduct has on 
the market. For example, the transactions in Markowski were self-
destructive and unprofitable; however, they still upended the market 
for the securities at issue, resulting in pricing inefficiencies that 
persisted for several months.244 Further, market actors other than the 
defendants likely also lost when the price for the asset plummeted. 
Because the scope of open-market manipulation schemes spreads 
beyond the losing trader, there is still a need for regulatory 
enforcement, even when the trader incurs losses. Indeed, declining to 
bring enforcement suits against unprofitable manipulation schemes 
may do more harm than good to the markets. Such an enforcement 
strategy would signal that incurring some losses may be a way for 
manipulative traders to evade prosecution, thereby weakening the 
 
 241. Id. 
 242. Supra Part II.B.  
 243. Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
 244. Id. at 530. 
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anti-manipulation regulatory framework. 
Additionally, market discipline is likely not effective in curbing 
open-market manipulation when the scheme occurs in separate 
markets. Recall, covered-manipulation schemes profit from movement 
in one market that triggers a right in another market. As such, when 
open-market trades are used to exert price pressure, thereby triggering 
payments owed on a related contract, the scheme is nonetheless 
profitable even after the manipulative effects of the trades have 
dissipated and the asset-price returns to its nonmanipulated level. The 
trader, therefore, is able to profit from the increase in price through 
her contract, but is not exposed to the asset-price decrease, when and 
if it occurs. The disconnect between the market that is being 
manipulated and the market that is the source of the trader’s profits 
means that market discipline is muted in these scenarios. Enforcement 
is needed to punish and deter open-market manipulation given the 
impotence of market forces. 
Further, open-market manipulation can be profitable. It is not 
self-deterring, and, therefore, regulatory intervention is necessary. 
Covered manipulation has significant profit potential because of the 
use of derivatives in these schemes. As discussed above, derivatives 
allow traders to benefit from or protect themselves against the 
changing price of an asset without owning the asset. These instruments 
can be highly leveraged, which provides traders the opportunity to gain 
high exposure to the asset’s price movement for a small cost.245 For 
example, suppose a trader purchases an option that is tied to the price 
of a barrel of oil, as determined by the leading oil benchmark. The 
trader is entitled to payment if the benchmark settlement price of oil is 
above $100 per barrel. For exposure to the price of 1000 barrels of oil, 
the trader must pay five percent of the value of the contract ($5000). If 
the trader is able to exert pressure on the benchmark settlement price, 
causing it to settle at or above $100 per barrel, the trader earns a profit 
of $95,000.246 Her profits are possible without owning a barrel of oil 
and, importantly, without the need to sell oil to the market, which 
would decrease her profits. The possible profits from similar open-
market schemes make them attractive for would-be manipulators. 
 
 245. Dick Bryan & Michael Rafferty, Financial Derivatives and the Theory of Money, 36 
ECON. & SOC. 134, 136 (2007) (“[D]erivatives provide ‘leverage’ and reduce the costs of hedging 
against unwanted price movements. As a corollary, they also cheapen the cost of speculating on 
price movements.”). 
 246. This is the price of 1000 barrels at $100 minus the cost of the contract—that is, $100,000 
- $5000 = $95,000.  
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Enforcement is important, therefore, to curb the occurrence of similar 
conduct in the markets. 
Despite the ability of market forces to sometimes respond to 
open-market manipulation, lawmakers play a vital role in ensuring the 
efficiency and integrity of the markets. Even when the markets are able 
to respond, regulators should still intervene to hold traders 
accountable for unprofitable attempts to manipulate the markets. 
Furthermore, because market discipline is unable to reach some forms 
of open-market manipulation, there remains a role for regulators to 
minimize the impact of open-market manipulation on the markets’ 
functioning. 
D. Proposals for Reform 
Open-market manipulation likely will remain part of the financial-
market landscape, given its profitability and the inherent difficulty of 
detection. The Commissions’ recognition of open-market 
manipulation and willingness to prosecute it are important and 
necessary first steps. However, because of the flawed approach they 
have adopted, the Commissions are ineffective at addressing open-
market manipulation. As with all forms of market manipulation, there 
is no proverbial silver bullet for eliminating open-market 
manipulation, but it is possible to minimize its occurrence and impact 
on the markets. This Article’s proposals are aimed at assisting the 
Commissions, courts, and private parties in effectively detecting and 
improving enforcement outcomes against open-market manipulation, 
without deterring or punishing beneficial legitimate transactions. 
1. Adopt a Harm-Based Approach.  The first, and most obvious, 
recommendation is that the Commissions—and any relevant courts—
jettison the intent-centric approach and replace it with the framework 
this Article proposes. The incomplete nature of the Commissions’ 
framework curtails their ability to effectively police open-market 
manipulation. Embracing the harm-based approach of this Article 
would provide a coherent and cogent basis on which to ground liability 
for open-market manipulation. The current intent-centric theory is 
only half finished. It divorces open-market manipulation from the 
concept of market harm, transforming it into something akin to a 
thought crime, with no evidence of illegal conduct. The Commissions, 
and private parties adopting this approach, actually weaken their 
claims of market manipulation. Courts are reticent to ground liability 
on bad intentions in the absence of misconduct or injurious impact. The 
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harm-based proposal enables plaintiffs to demonstrate that their 
manipulation allegations target harmful conduct that masquerades as 
legitimate transactions—not actually legitimate transactions. 
Importantly, the proposed harm-based approach makes explicit 
what the courts are already doing implicitly in their analysis of open-
market manipulation. Plaintiffs frame their allegations in terms of the 
intent of the trader to manipulate; in response, the courts use the 
language of intent to assess their claims. Yet, a closer reading of the 
cases demonstrates that the court is often in search of indicia of harm, 
either in the form of inefficiency or unfairness. Evidence of 
manipulative intent is often used to decipher whether and how 
transactions harmed the markets. In addition to being intellectually 
dishonest and raising due process concerns,247 this approach ultimately 
impedes effective regulation of open-market manipulation. If plaintiffs 
are not required to carry their burden to establish that traders’ conduct 
was harmful, then there cannot be a complete inquiry into whether the 
conduct was manipulative; and defendants do not have the opportunity 
to adequately defend against this implied basis for liability. Conflating 
intent and harm stymies the development of legal precedent on the 
question of open-market manipulation. Explicit adoption of intent and 
harm as twin bases for liability would reduce much of the judicial 
confusion surrounding open-market manipulation. 
2. Amend the Price-Artificiality Standard.  Price artificiality is an 
established basis for market manipulation but is rarely raised in claims 
of open-market manipulation, despite the fact that price distortion is a 
noteworthy negative effect of open-market manipulation. This is 
because the elements to prove price artificiality are exacting to the 
point of being unattainable. Interestingly, the CFTC imposed this 
standard on itself in one of its earliest market manipulation cases;248 
courts have since adopted the test, which has become an albatross 
around the Commissions’ necks.249 Because the test includes both a 
specific intent requirement and a showing of market power, it is a 
difficult one to fulfill. By requiring that defendants have the ability to 
influence prices, the test focuses on the defendants that dominate or 
control the market and use their market position to influence prices, as 
 
 247. Specifically, a defendant cannot adequately circumscribe her conduct ex ante if she is 
unaware of the standards by which she will be judged ex post. This creates concerns regarding 
enforcement of laws for which parties have no prior notice.  
 248. In re Cox, No. 75-16, 1987 WL 106879, at *4 (C.F.T.C. July 15, 1987). 
 249. See Part I.C.3 for the price artificiality test.  
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is done in corners and squeezes.250 This narrows the scope of the price-
artificiality test by excluding price distortion that is unconnected to 
market power, though even that distortion is possible in open-market 
manipulation. 
The standard for price artificiality should be changed to require 
general, rather than specific, intent. Additionally, if a claim of price 
manipulation does not involve allegations of market-power abuse, the 
plaintiff should not be required to demonstrate that the defendant 
dominated the market. Making these changes to the test would expand 
the applicability of price manipulation as a basis for liability, 
particularly for open-manipulation schemes that do not exclusively rely 
on market domination to create an artificial price. Furthermore, 
changing to general intent harmonizes the price-manipulation standard 
with other anti-manipulation provisions. 
Price distortion is one of the primary ways in which open-market 
manipulation harms the market, but the current standard does not 
provide an avenue by which these allegations can be made. Continuing 
to apply the current test would render price manipulation via open-
market manipulation an unprosecutable crime.251 This statement is not 
hyperbolic—when the price-artificiality standard was the only basis 
available to the CFTC for prosecuting market manipulation, the 
Commission won only a single case in over thirty years.252 Open-market 
manipulation cannot be addressed meaningfully if the Commissions 
are stymied by an onerous standard. Redefining the price-artificiality 
standard, therefore, is essential to holding accountable those who 
engage in open-market manipulation. 
3. Recognize Liability for Harming Market Integrity.  Maintaining 
market integrity is a well-accepted principle of financial regulation, yet 
it is not recognized as an independent basis for liability. For example, 
although liability for insider trading is discussed in terms of fairness, 
such liability is actually based on principles of fraud. As such, while 
market integrity must be maintained, liability for breaching it is based 
on other grounds. Open-market manipulation undoubtedly 
undermines market integrity by creating unfair market conditions that 
allow manipulators to profit at the expense of other market 
 
 250. For the difference between cornering and squeezing, see text accompanying supra note 
191.  
 251. Markham, Manipulation, supra note 93, at 283.  
 252. Abrantes-Metz, Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 182, at 359. 
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participants. Developing a new basis for liability requires more details 
than are possible in this Article, but the scope of the concept, 
specifically as a private cause of action, is explored briefly herein.253 
A cause of action based on market integrity would focus on the 
fairness of the manipulator’s conduct vis-à-vis her counterparty. This 
theory of liability would rest on holding the manipulator liable for 
breaching the reasonable expectations of the counterparty at the time 
of contracting. In this regard, liability for a breach of market integrity 
would be framed as akin to a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in a contract. The covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is a part of every contract, and it protects the parties’ 
reasonable, even if unstated, expectations upon entering into the 
contract.254 Interestingly, framing liability for market integrity as a 
contract-like cause of action would raise the possibility that parties 
might contractually waive the right to sue for open-market 
manipulation, even if one attempts or is successful in price distortion.255 
In such instances, harm to market integrity would not be a viable basis 
for liability; however, if prices have been distorted, the Commissions 
 
 253. Whether and to what extent third parties whose transactions are affected by open-market 
manipulation may bring a cause of action based on market integrity is beyond the scope of the 
current discussion. This Article frames market integrity liability as unfairness which is caused by 
a violation of a party’s reasonable expectations to a contract. Cf. supra Part III.B.2 (defining 
market integrity in terms of counterparties’ reasonable expectations in covered transactions). In 
so framing market integrity, this Article relies on privity of contract to uphold the proposed 
market-integrity cause of action. But this Article recognizes that market integrity may be framed 
more broadly to encompass third parties who are not in privity of contract with the manipulator. 
Should one frame market integrity more broadly, it would be akin to the fraud-on-the-market 
theory in which reliance of third parties may be presumed if misinformation is injected into an 
efficient market. See Korsmo, Mismatch, supra note 211, at 1124–28 (discussing the theoretical 
justifications underlying the fraud-on-the-market theory). If unfairness is framed as such, this 
would make the market-integrity cause of action available both to third parties who were in the 
market at the time of the manipulative acts and to regulators seeking to punish the conduct. 
However, in the interest of space and time, this Article consciously avoids this discussion and 
instead focuses on framing the proposed cause of action narrowly.  
 254. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 371 (1980) (explaining that “[t]he good faith performance doctrine 
establishes a standard for contract interpretation and a covenant that is implied in every contract” 
and that “the courts employ the good faith performance doctrine to effectuate the intentions of 
parties, or to protect their reasonable expectations”). 
 255. Again, to draw parallels to insider trading laws, this is similar to the Supreme Court’s 
assertion in United States v. O’Hagan that disclosure to one’s principal(s) of one’s intention to use 
material nonpublic information for personal gain would invalidate claims of insider trading under 
the misappropriation theory. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) 
(comparing the traditional or classical theory and the misappropriation theory of insider trading 
liability). 
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may nonetheless bring suit on the basis of harm to market efficiency. 
Recognizing harm to market integrity as a private cause of action, 
therefore, would not limit the ability of regulators to prosecute open-
market manipulation; rather, it would supplement the options 
available to the parties that are most affected by unfair and exploitative 
trades. 
4. Implement Disclosure Obligations for Certain Trading 
Strategies.  Open-market manipulation relies heavily on specific 
trading strategies that can impact and possibly distort prices.256 An 
extreme—but highly effective—response to the problems these 
strategies pose would be banning them entirely. Per se rules avoid 
confusion and allow for ease of enforcement.257 A ban on naked short 
selling and banging the close, for example, would draw a bright line and 
transform these types of trades into impermissible conduct, without 
regard for the intent of the trader. A blanket proscription on certain 
trades would lower the costs of detecting open-market manipulation, 
and enforcement would likewise be simplified. It is doubtful, however, 
that such a course of action for open-market manipulation schemes 
would be in the best interest of the markets and traders. The trading 
strategies used in open-market manipulation can sometimes enhance 
market efficiency, increase liquidity, and improve risk allocation in the 
markets.258 Further, traders may use a myriad of strategies, yet to be 
identified, to undermine market efficiency and integrity. Banning 
trading activities that are currently known makes way for traders to 
develop other strategies that may have the same effect but are excluded 
from the bright-line prohibition. A complete ban on these activities, 
therefore, would be a blunt response to a nuanced problem. 
A more promising response would be to impose disclosure 
requirements on traders who employ trading practices that may be 
used in open-market manipulation schemes.259 To be effective, the 
disclosure obligation should be twofold: internal, ex ante disclosures 
 
 256. Fisch, Gelbach & Klick, supra note 235, at 560–61 (“[T]he Supreme Court subsequently 
noted in Halliburton II, ‘[i]n the absence of price impact, Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory and 
presumption of reliance collapse.’” (citation omitted)). Hence, in the absence of price impact, it 
may be difficult to categorize trader behavior as manipulative. 
 257. Thel, supra note 36, at 289 (“Objective rules can interdict undesirable trades without a 
costly and perhaps hopeless inquiry into the trader’s motives.”). 
 258. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 259. Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development: Regulating 
the Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1209, 1248 (2010) (“[T]he bulk of regulatory 
emphasis in securities issuance and trading is on disclosure.”). 
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and external, ex post disclosures. First, entities should develop internal 
guidelines that clearly state whether and under what conditions their 
traders are allowed to engage in the trading strategies in question.260 
The internal guidelines should specify who may authorize use of these 
trading strategies, what factors should be considered in the decision to 
approve the request, the duration of the authorization, and under what 
circumstances trades can be exempt, among other details. Such ex ante 
rules would delineate the boundaries of acceptable conduct and 
minimize the abusive use of certain trading strategies. Trading in 
violation of the trader’s own internal guideline would raise red flags to 
lawmakers and may serve as the basis for further inquiry into the harm 
of the transactions on the markets. Consequently, preventing open-
market manipulation becomes part of an entity’s compliance 
obligations and serves as a first line of defense against improper and 
damaging conduct in the markets. 
Second, after executing certain types of trades, traders should self-
report their activity to the Commissions. In these disclosures, traders 
should reference compliance with internal guidelines. They should also 
provide justifications for their trading strategies. These disclosures 
would assist regulators in detecting possible open-market 
manipulation and in targeting their resources to investigating whether 
the transactions were harmful to the markets. Implementing ex ante, 
internal guidelines and ex post trade disclosures would benefit 
regulators, traders, and market participants. Through these steps, 
trading transparency would be increased, improving detection of 
potentially harmful transactions. The disclosure requirements would 
likely deter traders from employing problematic trading strategies 
without bona fide reasons, since using such strategies would expose 
them to additional scrutiny from both regulators and their 
counterparties. 
IV.  BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS 
This Article’s proposed approach to open-market manipulation 
has several benefits for the markets and lawmakers if embraced by the 
Commissions and the courts. This Part begins with a brief discussion of 
these benefits. It goes on to identify drawbacks that may arise from the 
 
 260. See, e.g., Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 18–19), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3151893 [https://perma.cc/32EG-SPAQ] 
(discussing the uses of internal guidelines as a way to prevent illegal conduct within firms). 
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proposed harm-based approach. This Part concludes by addressing 
some unresolved questions that this Article raises. 
A. Potential Benefits 
This Section discusses three ways that this Article’s harm-based 
approach and related proposals could improve the markets’ approach 
to open-market manipulation. First, this Article’s approach would 
reduce the costs of trades. Second, it would increase market certainty 
of the contours of liability for open-market manipulation, while 
providing regulators with flexibility in enforcement. Third, it would 
involve private parties in their own regulation, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of success. 
1. Reduced Transaction Costs.  An ineffective enforcement 
strategy against market manipulation has many of the same 
consequences as an absence of anti-manipulation laws. Markets in 
which manipulation goes unaddressed have higher transaction costs 
because market actors must account for possible manipulation in their 
pricing.261 Market participants who fear that their counterparties may 
exploit the markets to unfairly profit may refuse to enter into these 
transactions or only do so at a higher cost. Increased transaction costs 
result in fewer transactions being executed and a reduction in market 
liquidity overall.262 Similarly, the breadth of the Commissions’ intent-
centric approach may have discouraged some from engaging in 
beneficial transactions for fear of liability, thereby further reducing 
market liquidity and increasing transaction costs. 
This Article’s approach would be more effective in identifying 
open-market manipulation and separating it from legitimate 
transactions, using as a basis the harm the transactions inflict on the 
markets or counterparties. With the harm-based approach, the markets 
would be assured that the government is more effective in its efforts to 
detect, minimize the occurrence of, and punish the perpetrators of 
open-market manipulation. A more robust and theoretically sound 
approach would ensure that only those transactions that disrupt the 
markets would be punished. The direct result of this approach would 
 
 261. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 716 (“Restrictions on fraud and manipulation 
simultaneously lower information traders’ cost of verifying the credibility of information and 
improve their ability to make accurate predictions.”). 
 262. Yakov Amihud, Haim Mendelson & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Liquidity and Asset Prices, 1 
FOUND. & TRENDS IN FIN. 269, 270 (2005) (explaining that exogenous transaction costs reduce 
the number of agents in the market, reducing market liquidity). 
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be that traders would be likely to trust the pricing efficiency of the 
markets and would trade freely with their counterparties. This would 
result in reduced transaction costs, greater market liquidity, and 
enhanced market efficiency. Thus, this Article’s approach would 
reduce transaction costs by improving the efficacy of private and 
government actions against open-market manipulation. 
2. Market Certainty and Regulatory Flexibility.  This Article’s 
approach eliminates much of the confusion that surrounds the law of 
open-market manipulation. As discussed above, the current confusion 
in the law stems primarily from the use of intent as the sole basis for 
liability. Market actors are uncertain whether their conduct may be 
deemed manipulative based on the Commissions’ indeterminate 
inference of manipulative intent. The harm-based approach proposed 
herein moves away from the ambiguous intent standard and clearly 
specifies grounds on which facially legitimate transactions may be 
assessed as manipulative. By grounding liability on the effect of the 
trader’s conduct on the market, this Article’s approach bases liability 
on the combination of intent and harmful conduct. This would clarify 
for traders when their conduct may be considered manipulative, 
thereby allowing them to tailor their transactions to avoid allegations 
of manipulation. 
The harm-based approach would grant needed flexibility to 
regulators in combatting open-market manipulation. The approach 
does not limit open-market manipulation to specific trading strategies 
or conduct. Rather it accepts that the mechanisms by which traders 
may manipulate the markets are limitless. Lawmakers need access to 
wide-ranging theoretical and practical tools to effectively address 
open-market manipulation. The harm-based approach provides just 
that. Allowing allegations of open-market manipulation to be based on 
the market damage caused by trades enables lawmakers to address 
market activity that undermines the markets’ functioning. This 
approach keeps the Commissions in alignment with their regulatory 
goals by providing them with the ability to enforce the anti-
manipulation laws, while preserving meaningful limitations on the 
scope of the Commissions’ authority. 
It is likely that the harm-based approach would also improve the 
Commissions’ track record of enforcing open-market manipulation in 
the courts. As seen in the case studies in Part II.B, the courts often view 
allegations of open-market manipulation skeptically because of the 
singular focus on the trader’s intent. The inclusion of harm in the legal 
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theory of liability would likely allay courts’ skepticism of open-market 
manipulation because this theory explains why seemingly legitimate 
transactions are nonetheless manipulative. The law of open-market 
manipulation, as a result, would be more consistent. With a firm 
foundation for liability, lawmakers would be better able to articulate 
and analyze the factors that are necessary to prove market harm. Thus, 
open-market manipulation law would develop coherently and enhance 
market participants’ confidence in the law’s capabilities. 
3. Private-Party Engagement.  This Article’s approach engages 
market participants in all stages of the regulatory oversight of open-
market manipulation—deterrence, detection, and enforcement. First, 
this Article’s proposed internal-guidelines requirement is a form of 
self-regulation that asks traders and market participants to establish 
the rules by which they will utilize certain trading strategies. Self-
regulation is a useful tool that straddles the middle ground between 
top-down government regulation and the absence of regulation; self-
regulation is particularly beneficial in complex systems like the 
financial markets.263 Additionally, involving market participants in 
their own regulation minimizes resistance and fosters greater 
adherence to self-imposed rules.264 By establishing internal guidelines 
as a prerequisite for engaging in certain types of trades, this Article’s 
proposal enables traders to be part of the regulatory process. 
Importantly, the internal rules companies develop to guide their 
traders would be better tailored to the individual needs of each entity 
than any generally applicable prohibitions the Commissions could 
draft. This Article’s proposal, therefore, is a nuanced approach to 
trading strategies that are both problematic and beneficial; it would 
grant private parties the flexibility to decide whether and under what 
circumstances they will utilize certain trading strategies. Indeed, a 
company may determine that the scrutiny that would result from 
employing these suspicious trading practices is not worth the cost and 
choose to prohibit them altogether. As a result, there may be fewer 
instances of these disruptive trades as traders decide to forego them.265 
Second, through ex post disclosures, market actors would assist 
regulators in identifying manipulative conduct. Market manipulation is 
 
 263. See Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, supra note 97, at 1967–69 (discussing the benefits 
of self-regulation). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 1968 (“Self-regulation may, therefore, go beyond legal standards and impose 
higher ethical standards that benefit the entire industry.” (citation omitted)).  
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notoriously difficult to detect, and open-market manipulation, based 
on facially legitimate trades, is even more so. Having disclosure 
requirements in place would help lawmakers identify harmful conduct 
in two separate but related ways. Most obviously, trading disclosures 
would limit the data the Commissions must review de novo to 
distinguish legitimate trades from manipulative ones. These disclosures 
would be a useful mechanism, bringing attention to potentially 
disruptive trades that may only have a veneer of legitimacy, thereby 
enabling the Commissions to address open-market manipulation 
promptly. Less obviously, the process of identifying potentially 
harmful transactions would be advantageous to lawmakers because it 
would force them to consider which trading practices are harmful and 
why. In developing disclosure guidelines, the Commissions would be 
required to do their own internal analysis of trading patterns that they 
believe are disruptive and signal to the markets that these trades will 
be met with additional scrutiny. This process of engaging with the 
markets would likely endow the Commissions with a greater 
understanding of certain trading strategies and with an awareness of 
other strategies, not on the Commissions’ radar, that market 
participants find problematic. 
Third and lastly, this Article’s approach would engage market 
participants as private-party enforcers of anti-manipulation laws, 
thereby improving the likelihood that open-market manipulation will 
be punished. Anti-manipulation laws currently allow private parties to 
bring claims of market manipulation under both the Exchange Act and 
the CEA. Generally, the availability of private causes of action both 
increases compliance with the regulatory framework because of fear of 
private lawsuits and decreases government costs because private 
litigants shoulder some of the costs of enforcement.266 Private-party 
suits are an important tool in enforcing market discipline because they 
allow aggrieved counterparties to vindicate their rights without 
awaiting government intervention.267 This Article’s proposal 
supplements the currently existing private rights of action, most 
notably by expanding the grounds available for private claims. To the 
 
 266. Meric Sar, A Regulatory Retreat: Energy Market Exemption from Private Anti-
Manipulation Actions Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 605, 
635 (2017) (“[T]he most important benefits of the supplemental private right of action approach 
are (i) greater compliance with . . . norms due to greater deterrence caused by the potential of 
private lawsuits, and (ii) lower costs for the agency due to the allocation of litigation costs between 
private claimants and the . . . agency.”). 
 267. Id. 
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extent that traders are able to defend themselves against market 
manipulation, they are more likely to participate in the markets. 
Private causes of action also ensure that recourse is available even in 
instances of open-market manipulation that are too insignificant to 
warrant the full-scale efforts of agency litigation. Furthermore, 
recognizing harm to market integrity as an independent cause of action 
would free private plaintiffs from the strictures of proving price 
manipulation, as long as they are able to demonstrate that transactions 
were manipulative due to their unfairness. 
B. Drawbacks 
Despite the benefits of this Article’s proposal, there are potential 
drawbacks to the adoption of a harm-based approach. This Section 
addresses four objections. First, is exclusive reliance on ex post 
enforcement effective in preventing open-market manipulation? 
Second, does the proposal increase the difficulty of proving open-
market manipulation? Third, is the proposal’s reliance on self-
regulation flawed? Fourth, will recognition of market integrity as a 
basis for liability increase litigation in a way that proves costly and 
ineffective? 
1. Ex Post Regulation.  This Article proposes identifying open-
market manipulation by assessing whether the trader’s conduct 
harmed market efficiency, market integrity, or both. The proposed 
regulation of open-market manipulation, therefore, is primarily 
backward-looking, thereby requiring that harm occur before liability 
attaches. There are drawbacks to regulating ex post, but in the case of 
open-market manipulation, ex post regulation is the best course of 
action. 
Financial regulation is rarely exclusively prescriptive or reactive; 
it is usually a mix of both because prescriptive regulation requires that 
enforcement be upheld, and reactive regulation requires, at a 
minimum, that broad-based rules alert the markets of potential 
liability. Nonetheless, one may classify regulatory frameworks as 
primarily ex ante and prescriptive or ex post and reactive, depending 
on the focus of regulations. Ex post regulations attempt to mitigate 
harm that has already occurred, rather than preventing the harm from 
occurring in the first place.268 In the financial markets, relying primarily 
 
 268. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the 
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 92–93 (2013) (explaining that the goal of ex 
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on ex post regulations may have significant negative repercussions on 
the markets, particularly if manipulative conduct is not discovered, 
halted, and punished promptly. 
Determining the optimal timing and focus of regulations is a 
complex task, but it turns on analysis of three essential considerations: 
information availability, effectiveness of sanctions, and administrative 
costs.269 First, with respect to information availability, if regulators have 
limited information about the conduct they are regulating or deterring, 
then legal intervention should be ex post. Regulators need information 
about the nature of the misconduct, the magnitude of the harm, the 
identity of the perpetrator, or some combination thereof in order to 
effectively regulate conduct ex ante.270 In the absence of such 
information, it is better to allow markets to operate freely and to allow 
regulatory intervention only once more accurate information is 
available. Second, the timing of regulation depends on the 
effectiveness of sanctions in deterring undesirable conduct.271 
Sanctions are efficacious in discouraging misconduct when they can 
approximate the type and scope of harm that results from the 
misconduct.272 As such, sanctions should be ex ante if they can target 
the harm and its expected magnitude before the conduct has occurred. 
On the other hand, regulation should be ex post if the misconduct and 
its magnitude are best evaluated afterward. Third, the administrative 
costs of regulatory intervention must be considered. Ex ante regulation 
is preferred if the costs of monitoring and policing are less than the 
costs of investigating and litigating misconduct.273 
Because of the sensitivity of the markets to destabilizing shocks 
that have wide-reaching effects throughout the economy, it may be 
 
ante regulations is the prevention of negative financial shocks, and that ex post laws aim to 
mitigate the harm of financial shocks once they have occurred); Donald C. Langevoort, Managing 
the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 
VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1154 (2003) (“Expressing the duty [to disclose] simply anticipates that 
investors are often misled by the nondisclosure and suffer considerable harm. Thus [the duty to 
disclose] should be explicitly within the purview of the federal securities laws.”).  
 269. See supra Part I (discussing existing regulations). 
 270. See Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, supra note 97, at 1938 (discussing the type and form 
of information needed to effectively craft ex ante regulations); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 572–75 (2004) (advising that the fundamental 
dimensions of legal intervention fall under three categories: timing, form, and the private or public 
nature of the enforcement). 
 271. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, supra note 97, at 1938. 
 272. Id.  
 273. Id.  
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problematic to focus regulation on addressing impediments to market 
efficiency and integrity after harm has occurred. These concerns are 
valid, and considerations regarding the timing of financial regulation 
ought not be ignored; however, in the context of open-market 
manipulation, regulation will be most effective if implemented ex post. 
Importantly, while open-market manipulation can and does harm 
the markets, the effects of these manipulative schemes are likely to be 
contained. Both naked and covered manipulation typically target a 
single asset, which makes systemic market destabilization unlikely. 
Neither form of open-market manipulation is prolonged in its duration, 
as manipulators typically focus their efforts in time periods as short as 
minutes. Covered manipulation directed at distorting a benchmark 
may be one of the most impactful open-manipulation schemes; 
however, even then, such schemes target a single benchmark on a 
specific day.274 Therefore, the likelihood that open-market 
manipulation will be a source of systemic risk is quite low.275 
Furthermore, based on the factors for determining the timing of 
legal intervention, open-market manipulation falls squarely in the ex 
post category. The importance of market harm to the identification of 
open-market manipulation means that regulators do not have 
sufficient information before the trades are executed and the impact of 
the transactions on the markets is analyzed. Sanctions put in place to 
deter open-market manipulation, therefore, would have little or no 
impact because it is almost impossible to anticipate the scope and 
nature of the harm that will result from an open-market manipulation 
scheme. Also, the administrative costs of monitoring and policing for 
open-market manipulation likely outweigh those for investigating and 
litigating because open-market manipulation involves legitimate trades 
that are difficult to detect. Lastly, it is important to note that although 
this Article’s proposal is primarily focused on ex post remediation, it 
has some prescriptive aspects aimed at easing the detection and 
 
 274. This is unlike benchmark manipulation, in which traders manipulate benchmarks for 
years by distorting the inputs over which they have control. Benchmark manipulation may be 
accomplished through trades, but it is more effective when the traders have control of the 
calculation of the benchmark and distort it from within. See generally id. (discussing benchmark 
manipulation). 
 275. John C. Coffee, Jr., Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital to Mitigate 
Systemic Risk 1 (Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 380, 2010) (noting that 
systemic risk describes the “localized economic shock [that has] worldwide repercussions because 
of the interconnections between financial institutions.” (citing Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 
97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008))). 
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deterrence of open-market manipulation.276 This Article’s proposal 
recognizes the importance of establishing mechanisms preemptively to 
facilitate better ex post enforcement. In this way, it would minimize the 
likelihood that open-market manipulation would go unchecked for an 
extended period, wreaking havoc on the markets, because of a merely 
reactive framework. 
2. Difficulty of Proving Harm.  The harm-based framework this 
Article proposes requires that plaintiffs demonstrate both 
manipulative intent and harm to the markets. This approach increases 
the evidentiary burden on the government and private parties, which 
may make it more difficult to allege open-market manipulation. 
Additionally, this Article’s proposal incorporates price manipulation—
a notoriously difficult standard—as one of the means by which 
plaintiffs can demonstrate market harm. Thus, a legitimate question 
exists as to whether the proposed harm-based approach improves 
enforcement against open-market manipulation. 
This Article’s proposal brings open-market manipulation in line 
with other conduct and activity that is deemed manipulative. 
Definitions of market manipulation include both intent and harm, 
whether the allegations are based on fraud, misrepresentation, or 
fictional trading. The Commissions’ current approach to open-market 
manipulation dispenses with harm and focuses solely on the intent of 
the trader. Thus, this Article’s approach merely corrects the anomalous 
treatment of open-market manipulation and harmonizes it with other 
forms of market manipulation. Additionally, there should be little 
concern over the harm-based approach placing a heavier burden on the 
government. Claims of open-market manipulation rest on allegations 
that legitimate transactions should be the basis of liability. If the 
government wants to hold someone liable for legitimate transactions, 
it ought to be required to meet a higher burden than one fulfilled by 
circumstantial evidence of intent alone. 
Further, it is important to note that the Commissions and private 
plaintiffs have not been particularly successful in their enforcement of 
open-market manipulation on the basis of intent alone. As discussed 
previously, courts have been skeptical of allegations for manipulation 
based on intent alone. As a result, some courts have either refused to 
find liability without a showing of “something more”277 or held 
 
 276. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the benefits of this Article’s proposal).  
 277. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To be 
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defendants liable only if their trades entirely lacked an investment 
basis.278 The harm-based approach would allay the courts’ concerns and 
provide the Commissions with a way to respond to courts’ underlying 
inquiry: Why are these facially legitimate trades manipulative? Thus, this 
Article’s proposed approach responds to courts’ skepticism by showing 
how legitimate trades can be used to manipulate the markets via the 
resulting market injury. Harm offers the Commissions and the courts 
an objective and verifiable way to identify open-market manipulation 
that is less circumstantial than the previous intent-centric approach. 
3. Self-Regulation.  This Article’s proposal relies on entities and 
traders adopting and enforcing internal guidelines for potentially 
manipulative trading strategies. Traders would also be expected to self-
report conduct that may subject them to enhanced scrutiny and, 
possibly, to enforcement actions. Including self-regulation as a key 
component of this Article’s proposed framework raises important 
questions and concerns. 
Self-regulation requires the government to trust market actors to 
participate in their regulation. Critics of self-regulation posit that 
“private profit-seeking enterprises cannot be trusted to regulate their 
own activities in a manner conducive to promotion of publicly 
desirable goals.”279 This observation is all the more poignant given that 
traders would be expected to self-report conduct that may result in 
their own liability. 
These concerns with respect to self-regulation should not be 
ignored, but they are not as significant within the context of this 
Article’s proposal. This Article’s proposal does not rest on self-
regulation operating in a vacuum. Rather, self-regulation would be one 
of the tools available to regulators in detecting open-market 
manipulation. The government should also coordinate with exchange 
operators to detect trading activities that may have been unreported 
and to verify reports that have been made. Even in the absence of 
compliance and disclosure requirements, the Commissions are able to 
identify some instances of open-market manipulation. The inclusion of 
traders in their own regulation would only enhance the effectiveness of 
the process. 
 
actionable as a manipulative act, short selling must be willfully combined with something more to 
create a false impression of how market participants value a security.”). 
 278. See supra Part II.B (discussing SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).  
 279. Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 674 (2010). 
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4. Increased Litigation.  Lastly, one may also be concerned that this 
Article’s advocacy for market integrity as an additional basis of liability 
would increase litigation for heretofore acceptable conduct. While this 
may occur, it is more likely that in the absence of a private cause of 
action for unfair market behavior, unlawful conduct escapes liability, 
to the detriment of market integrity and efficiency. The cost of 
increased litigation is less important when weighed against the benefit 
to the markets from allowing market actors to vindicate their rights. 
This is particularly true considering the possibility that market 
participants may still utilize contractual provisions to waive or enforce 
their right to engage in otherwise unfair market conduct. Therefore, 
any increase in private litigation may, in fact, increase market integrity 
and efficiency, and to the extent that traders want to avoid being held 
liable for unfairness, they may contractually opt out of that liability, as 
long as their counterparties agree. 
CONCLUSION 
Imposing liability for legitimate transactions raises knotty but 
important questions. The intent of the actor, however, is not a legally 
adequate or sound basis on which to ground liability. Within the 
current approach—one espoused by the Commissions, private 
plaintiffs, and some courts—intent plays an outsized role that does not 
increase market safety because it fails to accurately target open-market 
transactions that undermine the markets. This Article’s proposal 
addresses this glaring shortcoming. 
This Article’s approach to open-market manipulation employs 
intent to ensure that traders are not liable for negligent or accidental 
trades that cause harm. This approach also includes harm in the 
analysis of open-market manipulation, adding needed clarity to this 
corner of the market. A harm-based analysis provides a coherent way 
to distinguish between legitimate transactions and manipulative 
conduct. This approach would assure market actors that their intent 
alone will not make them liable for manipulation, and it would 
appropriately target those transactions that impair the functioning of 
the market. Furthermore, by considering market harm in terms of 
market efficiency and integrity, this Article acknowledges a form of 
market injury that is more amorphous—unfairness—but nonetheless 
detrimental to the markets. The Commissions and the courts must 
amend their approach to open-market manipulation. Adopting a 
harm-based approach would provide a more complete basis on which 
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to address this form of market manipulation, and it would ultimately 
improve the markets’ efficiency and enhance public trust and 
confidence in the markets. 
